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TOWARDS A SEMANTIC REINTERPRETATION OF BINDING THEORY
Philippe Schlenker
 UCLA & Institut Jean-Nicod
Abstract: Binding Theory is traditionally considered a part of syntax, in the sense that some
derivations that would otherwise be interpretable are ruled out by purely formal principles. Thus
'Johni likes himi' would  in standard semantic theories yield a perfectly acceptable interpretation; it is
only because of Condition B that the sentence is deviant on its coreferential reading. We explore an
alternative in which some binding-theoretic principles (esp. Condition C, Condition B, a modified
version of the Locality of Variable Binding argued for by A. Kehler and D. Fox, and Weak and
Strong Crossover) follow from the interpretive procedure - albeit a somewhat non-standard one. In a
nutshell, these principles are taken to reflect the way in which sequences of evaluation are
constructed in the course of the interpretation of a sentence. The bulk of the work is done by a
principle of Non-Redundancy, which prevents any given object from appearing twice in any given
sequence of evaluation.
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30 Overview
q Syntactic Accounts of Binding Theory
Binding Theory is traditionally considered a part of syntax, in the sense that certain structures that
would otherwise be interpretable semantically are ruled out by purely formal constraints. In the
account offered in Chomsky (1981), syntactic structures come equipped with indices whose intended
(but implicit) semantics is to encode coreference. Certain configurations are then ruled out by formal
constraints on binding. As in formal logic, the relation a binds b holds just in case (i) a and b bear
the same index k, (ii) b is in the scope of (=is c-commanded by) a, and (iii) there is no other element
a' with index k such that (a) a' is in the scope of a, and (b) b is in the scope of a' (for otherwise a'
rather than a would bind b). Binding is then subject to the following (simplified) constraints, where
the 'local domain' of an element is -very roughly- its clause:
(1) Condition A: A reflexive pronoun must be bound in its local domain.
a. John1 likes himself1
b. *[John1's mother]2 likes himself1
c. *John1 thinks that Mary2 likes himself1
(2) Condition B: A non-reflexive pronoun cannot be bound in its local domain.
a. *John1  likes him1
b. [John1's mother]2 likes him1
c. John1 thinks that Mary2 likes him1
(3) Condition C: A proper name or a definite description cannot be bound (at all)
a. ??John1 likes John1
a'. *He1 likes John1
b. [John1's mother]2 likes John1
c. ??John1 thinks that Mary2 likes John1
An additional principle constrains configurations in which a quantificational element can take scope
over  (or 'cross over') a pronoun. One possible statement is the following:
(4) (Weak) Crossover Constraint: A pronoun cannot be bound by an element that is in a non-
argument position1 (=an A'- position).
a. Who1 [t1 likes his1 mother]?
b. ??Who1 does his1 mother like t1?
c. [Every boy]1 [t1 likes [his1 mother]] (pronounced as: Every boy likes his mother)
d. ?? [Every boy]1 [[his1 mother] likes t1] (pronounced as: His mother likes every boy)
(The preceding representations are the syntactician's 'L(ogical) F(orms)', which are obtained by
moving quantificational elements covertly to their scope positions). Violations of the Weak
Crossover Constraint yield relatively mild cases of ungrammaticality when the offending pronoun
does not c-command the trace of its binder. When it does c-command it, as in *Who1 does he1 like
t1?, the violation becomes much more severe and is for this reason called 'Strong Crossover'.
Accounts that followed Chomsky's groundbreaking work developed Binding Theory in
several directions:
(i) Crosslinguistic studies refined the typology of elements subject to binding principles, and
parametrized those principles to account for language variation.
(ii) The syntax and semantics of indices was clarified and systematized. Important work in this
domain was done by semanticists, esp. Heim (1993) and more recently Büring (2002a, b).
(iii) Reinhart (1983) sought to attain greater explanatory depth by deriving Condition C effects from
a pragmatic principle that favors structures in which coreference is a result of syntactic binding
4rather than an 'accident' of the semantic interpretation. According to Reinhart, John1 thinks that
Mary2 likes John1 is ruled out because John1 thinks that Mary2 likes him1, which has the same truth-
conditions but involves binding, is deemed preferable by her principle (Reinhart's analysis was
refined in Heim (1993)). Whatever the merits of Reinhart's approach, it shares with other analyses a
syntactic core, in the sense that the ungrammatical or dispreferred structures are assumed to be in
principle interpretable by the semantic component.
q A Semantic Alternative
In this paper we explore a semantic alternative to these accounts (other semantic accounts of
binding-theoretic constraints have been developed recently, esp. by A. Branco, C. Barker & C. Shan,
A. Butler, and P. Jacobson. A systematic comparison is left for future research). We concentrate on
the most basic data, with the hope that refinements of the standard Binding Theory could in principle
be incorporated into our framework (whether this is so is as yet unclear). As in most other semantic
theories, a sentence is interpreted by evaluating its components under certain modifications of an
initial assignment function, or sequence of evaluation. We posit simple (but non-standard)
constraints on the construction of sequences, and show that these suffice to derive Condition C,
Condition B, and a version of the Locality of Variable Binding discussed in Kehler (1993) and Fox
(2000); with one additional assumption we also give an account of Weak and Strong Crossover
effects, and solve an independent problem that our theory encounters in the analysis of
quantification. While some of the predictions are different from those of existing theories (especially
when it comes to the Locality of Variable Binding), we will mostly attempt to match our
competitors' basic results within a system that is arguably simpler and has in any event a very
different deductive structure. Finally, although the theory has nothing insightful to say about
Condition A at this point, an analysis of reflexives as arity-reducers can probably be made
compatible with the present framework; this is briefly discussed in Appendix II.
The general idea we pursue is that a sequence of evaluation represents a state of a memory
register, which is constructed as a sentence is processed, top-down, in accordance with  the
following rules:
(5) a. Treatment of R-Expressions (i.e. Proper Names, Demonstrative Pronouns and Definite
Descriptions)2
When an R-expression (proper name, definite description or demonstrative pronoun) is
processed, its denotation is added at the end of the register (i.e. at the end of the sequence of
evaluation).
b. Treatment of Non-Demonstrative Pronouns
When a (non-demonstrative) pronoun is processed, some element of the register is recovered
and moved to the end of the register.
In order to indicate which element is moved in this way, non-demonstrative pronouns are given
negative indices such as -1, -2, etc, which indicate how far from the end of the register their
denotation is to be found (by contrast demonstrative pronouns are assumed to have positive indices;
their interpretation is given by a separate 'demonstrative function', discussed below; they are then
treated in the same way as proper names). Thus  he-1 evaluated under a sequence JohnˆMaxˆPeter
denotes Peter, he-2 denotes Max, and he-3 denotes John. This notation makes syntactic representations
somewhat simpler than is commonly the case, since indices appear only on bindees and never on
binders. Thus instead of writing Johni thinks that hei is clever  or John li i thinks that hei clever, we
will use the representation: John thinks that he-1 is clever. This yields the desired dependency
because when the sentence is evaluated under a sequence s, the denotation of John (call it j) is added
at the end of s as soon as the subject is processed. As a result, he-1 is evaluated under the extended
sequence sˆj. But by definition he-1 denotes the last element of sˆj, i.e. John, as is desired. Although
5there are important differences, our system shares this 'semi-variable-free' nature with the so-called
'De Bruijn' notation of the l-calculus (see Barendregt (1984, pp. 579-581) for a very brief
introduction to the De Bruijn notation; see also Ben-Shalom 1996, Dekker 1994 and van Eijck 2001
for other applications of the De Bruijn notation to the analysis of anaphora).
The values of individual-denoting terms are added to the sequence of evaluation in an order
that mirrors their hierarchy in the syntactic structure. As a result, when an atomic predicate P has just
been processed we can know for sure that (i) in case P is intransitive, the denotation of its subject is
found in the last position of the sequence; (ii) in case P is transitive, the denotations of its subject and
object are in positions -2 and -1 respectively (this is because the object is more embedded than the
subject, and hence in a top-down procedure it is processed 'after' it). In this way the values of the
arguments of the predicate P can be recovered from the sequence under which P is evaluated. It
makes sense, then, to talk of the truth of P under a sequence s, which will yield rules of interpretation
such as the following, where j is John and b is Bill (for perspicuity I write sequences of evaluation in
normal font rather than as superscripts; I identify 1-membered sequences with their only element,
and I write sˆs' for the concatenation of sequence s and sequence s'):
(6) a. John hates Bill
b. [[a]] s=[[a]] s=1 iff
[Step 1: the subject has been processed] [[hates Bill]] sˆj=1, iff
[Step 2: the object has been processed] [[hates]] sˆjˆb=1, iff
[Step 3: the predicate is evaluated] jˆbŒI(hates)
The last major principle we will need rules out redundancy in registers, in the sense that it does
not allow one and the same object to occur twice in any given register:
(7) Non-Redundancy
No object may occur twice in the same sequence of evaluation (see Higginbotham (1983, (26))
for a related principle)  
We speculate that Non-Redundancy is a general cognitive principle, which requires quite generally
that a new cognitive file should not be created for an object which is already stored in memory. Be
that as it may, it is important to note that Non-Redundancy is in a sense nothing new. This principle
is implicitly assumed in Chomsky and Lasnik's classic syntactic accounts of Binding Theory. To see
this, consider the sentence He hates him. The empirical observation is that he and him cannot corefer.
Condition B is stated to rule out the representation Hei hates himi, where he and him bear the same
index i. But this still fails to disallow Hei hates himk, where i and k are different indices that both
happen to refer to John.  The necessary stipulation is that no two indices may refer to the same
individual. Restated in terms of sequences rather than assignment functions, this simply says that the
same individual may not occur twice in any sequence, which is just our principle of Non-
Redundancy. Our claim is that with the non-standard semantics we will develop shortly, Non-
Redundancy can do almost all the work - no additional syntactic principles are required. It can also
be checked that our principles are indeed semantic in nature, since all they do is specify (a) how
sequences of evaluation are constructed, and (b) which sequences are admissible.
A final proviso is in order. If our metaphor of the sequence of evaluation as a memory
register is to be taken seriously, our technical apparatus must be reinterpreted, since it cannot be the
object itself, but rather a standard name or description of the object which appears in a memory
register (when I talk about George W. Bush, my memory register might contain a description of W.,
but certainly not W. himself, who wouldn't fit in there anyway). This move from objects to standard
names or descriptions thereof is independently motivated on two grounds. First, as was shown in
Reinhart (1983) and further elaborated in Heim (1993), there are various exceptions to Binding
Theory that can only be handled by making semantic values more fine-grained, and thus moving
from objects to descriptions or 'guises'3. Second, a theory-internal problem that we will encounter in
6the analysis of quantification will again be solved by appealing to implicit descriptions. For
simplicity, however, most of the theory is built as if sequences of evaluation contained objects; the
same simplifying assumption has been made in Appendix III, which provides a precise
implementation of a large part of the theory.
q Structure of the Theory
The structure of the theory to be developed is as follows:
(i) The Treatment of R-expressions and Non-Redundancy conspire to derive Condition C: as soon as
an R-expression is processed (be it a proper name, a definite description or a pronoun), its value, for
instance j, must appear at the end of the sequence of evaluation. When a coreferring proper name or
definite description is processed lower down in the tree, another occurrence of j is added at the end
of the same sequence, as required by the Treatment of R-Expressions. As a result, the sequence of
evaluation ends up having the same object (=j) in two different cells, and this violates Non-
Redundancy. Here is a simple illustration:
(8) a. John [likes John]
b. Step 1: the subject has been  processed => sˆj
c. Step 2: the object has been  processed   => sˆjˆj (this violates Non-Redundancy)
We will show that with one small additional assumption the theory also explains why John talking to
Mary may not normally say John is happy or Mary is happy - this observation will in fact serve to
motivate Non-Redundancy.
(ii) The Treatment of R-expressions and Non-Redundancy taken together leave very little leeway for
the analysis of pronouns -  something like our Treatment of Non-Demonstrative Pronouns must be
posited. The latter,  together with Non-Redundancy and the rule of interpretation of atomic
predicates, derives Condition B (or rather, the version of Condition B given in Reinhart & Reuland
1993).  To take the example of a transitive verb, the idea is simply that after the subject is processed,
its value, say j, must appear at the end of the sequence of evaluation. But then -by the Treatment of
Non-Demonstrative Pronouns- all a coreferring pronoun can do is to recover this value, i.e. to move
it to the end of the sequence, and crucially not to introduce a new occurrence of j in the sequence
(note that in any even this would run afoul of Non-Redundancy). As a result, there is simply no way
for a sentence such as John likes him-1 to mean that John likes John, as this would require that like be
evaluated under a sequence whose last two elements are jˆj, which is precisely what cannot be
obtained. This is illustrated in the following simplified example, where I have assumed that when an
object is recovered and moved to the end of the sequence, it leaves in its original position the
element #, which indicates that that position is now empty4.
(9) a. John likes him-1 (evaluated under a sequence s)
b. Step 1: the subject is processed => j is added to the sequence: sˆj
c. Step 2: the object is processed => j is moved to the end, leaving #: sˆ#ˆj
d. Step 3: the predicate is evaluated, and recovers the last two elements of   sˆ#ˆj, i.e. #ˆj.
Since one of the last two elements of the final sequence sˆ#ˆj contains #, the last step of the
evaluation procedure will result in a failure, as is desired.
(iii) The Treatment of Non-Demonstrative Pronouns and Non-Redundancy derive a principle of
Locality of Variable Binding - one that I adopt from Kehler (1993) and Fox (2000) (though Fox has
a slightly different version of the rule). Suppose that a pronoun p appears in a structure [... A ... B...
p...] where p is in the scope of B, which is itself in the scope of A. Standard theories postulate that if
A and B both refer to an object i, p may come to denote i by being bound by A or by B, and both
7options should be open. Fox and Kehler argue that this is incorrect, and that in such cases if p is to
denote i it must be bound by the closest possible antecedent, namely B. In our framework this
follows from the very architecture of the system because when p is processed there is a single
occurrence of i in the sequence of evaluation, with the result that a single indexing - the 'economical'
one- is possible.
 (iv) We will see that the simplest version of our system encounters problems in the analysis of
quantified structures. A stipulation will be needed, to the effect that elements introduced by
quantifiers appear in an independent sequence, which we call the 'quantificational sequence', and
which is not constrained by Non-Redundancy. The advantage of this analysis is that it will yield an
immediate account of Weak and Strong Crossover effects.
(v) Various refinements are considered in the course of the paper; they allow us in particular to
dispense with empty cells when temporal anaphora is incorporated to the analysis, and to account for
anaphora with split antecedents as well as disjoint reference effects.
The following summarizes the deductive structure of the theory.
(10) Structure of the theory
  Treatment of R-expressions + Non-Redundancy
  
        Treatment of Non-Demonstrative Pronouns
 -Condition C
  -Condition on reference to speaker/hearer
 -Condition B
 -Locality of Variable Binding
             + Additional Assumption
 -Solution of a problem in the analysis of quantification
 -Weak and Strong Crossover
1 Non-Redundancy and Condition C
1.1 The Interpretation of R-expressions and Predicates
q Sequences of Evaluation and Linguistic Context
The general intuition we pursue is that a sequence of evaluation represents the linguistic context with
respect to which a constituent is evaluated. The linguistic context has two components:
(a) first, it includes those objects that are given by the mere existence of the speech act, i.e. a speaker
and an addressee. In a more sophisticated version of the system we will also include a time of
utterance (and in a still more sophisticated version possible worlds would also appear in the sequence
of evaluation); but to keep things simple we  start by omitting time altogether5. We further assume
that the speaker and addressee are introduced with a role, respectively 'A' and 'H' (for 'author' and
'hearer), so that we may recover from a sequence of evaluation the identity of the speaker and hearer
8(to be concrete, the speaker is that object of the sequence which appears with the role 'A', while the
addressee is the object that appears with the role 'H')
 (b) second, the sequence of evaluation includes the objects that have been linguistically introduced,
i.e. which are the denotations of terms that have been processed.
Given a very simple set-up the sequence will also encode the order in which the terms are processed.
In a top-down procedure, this order mirrors the scope (=c-command) relations that are found in the
syntax. This will be the key to achieve a semantic reinterpretation of standard syntactic conditions on
binding. It should be emphasized, however, that this result follows from entirely standard
assumptions about the syntax/semantics interface: the semantics interprets syntactic structures
compositionally, undoing step by step the sister-to-sister configurations constructed by the syntax.
Importantly, the denotation of demonstrative pronouns is assumed not to be given directly by the
sequence of evaluation, but through the intermediary a 'demonstrative function' D which assigns a
value to 'free' pronouns (the term 'free pronoun' used in other theories might be clearer than
'demonstrative', since in  His mother likes John the free pronoun his is not always called
'demonstrative', although for our purposes it should count as such). Thus if D(1)=John, the speaker
of s intended to refer to John by uttering the pronoun he1. There is a weak conceptual argument and a
strong empirical one for distinguishing the demonstrative function from the sequence of evaluation.
The conceptual point is that demonstrative pronouns need extra-linguistic information to get a
denotation - for instance they may be completed by a demonstrative gesture on the part of the
speaker; in that sense their denotation cannot be recovered from the speech act in a narrow sense.
The empirical argument is that in a sentence such as His mother likes John, where his denotes John,
we do not want to say that John must already be found in the initial sequence to provide his with a
referent, for this would incorrectly predict a violation of Non-Redundancy when John is processed
(two occurrences of John would be found in the final sequence; see the discussion below). For all
intents and purposes we will treat demonstrative pronouns in the same way as proper names, which
will account for the fact that He1 likes John, where D(1)=John, is as ungrammatical as John likes
John.
q Basic Rules
Let us now consider some basic examples. Suppose that John, talking to Mary, said: Ann runs. The
initial sequence is simply jAˆmH, where jA and mH can be seen respectively as the abbreviations of the
pairs <j, A> and <m, H>, indicating that John (=j) is the speaker  of the speech act, and that Mary
(=m) is its addressee. By the Treatment of R-expressions, when Ann is processed, its value is added
to the sequence, yielding a new sequence jAˆmHˆa. At that point all the arguments of the verb have
been processed, and thus runs is evaluated under the sequence jAˆmHˆa. Since this verb is intransitive,
it is true under the sequence jAˆmHˆa just in case its last element, namely a, lies in the extension of the
predicate at the world of evaluation w (=Iw(run)). We thus obtain the following interpretation, in
which we have relativized truth and denotation to a sequence of evaluation and world parameter:
(11)  [[ Ann run]] w jAˆmH =1 iff [[ run]] w jAˆmHˆa =1, iff aŒIw(run)
A transitive construction is interpreted in the same way, except that the verb ends up being true just
in case the pair of the last two elements of the final sequence lie in its extension:
(12)  [[Ann hate Bill]] w jAˆmH=1 iff [[hate Bill]] w jAˆmHˆa =1, iff [[hate]] w jAˆmHˆaˆb=1,
iff aˆbŒIw(hate)  (since aˆb are the last two elements of jAˆmHˆaˆb)
On a technical level, the definition in (13) gives a preliminary implementation of our Treatment of
R-expressions:
9(13) Treatment of R-expressions (preliminary version)
If a is a proper name,  a definite description or a demonstrative pronoun (i.e. a pronoun with a
positive subscript),  [[ [a b] ]] w s = [[ [b a] ]] w s= [[b]] wsˆ[[a]]ws
The definition is straightforward, and simply formalizes the idea that the denotation of an R-
expression is systematically added at the end of the sequence of evaluation; the sister to the R-
expression is then evaluated under this new sequence. Obviously basic rules for referring terms and
predicates must be added as well. For the former the definition in (14) will do, and for that latter that
in (15):
(14) Interpretation of R-expressions (preliminary)
a. If a is a proper name,   [[a]] ws=Iw(a)
b. If p is a pronoun and i is a non-negative integer , [[pi]] ws=D(i).
c. [[ [the b] ]] ws=#  iff there is 0 or more than one object d satisfying [[b]] ws,d=1.
Otherwise [[the b]] ws=d, where d satisfies [[b]]wsˆd=16
(15) Interpretation of Predicates (preliminary)
Let P be an n-place predicate.
[[P]] ws=# iff  one of the last n elements of s is # or s violates Non-Redundancy [the latter clause
is justified in the next section]. Otherwise, [[P]] ws=1 iff snŒIw(Pn), where sn is the sequence of
the last n elements of s.
(sn must be defined carefully to take into account the case in which one of the last n elements is a
pair of the form <d, A> or <d, H>, in case d is the speaker or hearer. In such cases we want sn to
recover only the first coordinates of the relevant elements. The proper definitions are given in
Appendix III.)7
1.2 Non-Redundancy
q Linguistic Motivation for Non-Redundancy: constraints on terms denoting the speaker or hearer
We now come to the motivation for our crucial Principle, Non-Redundancy. As was mentioned
earlier, a version of this principle is implicitly assumed in most syntactic theories of binding, since
without it there would be no way to rule out on syntactic grounds a sentence such as He1 likes him2,
where both he1 and he2 refer to John. But there is also independent motivation for Non-Redundancy.
Notice that John talking to Mary may not normally refer to himself or to her using a proper name
such as John or Mary, or even a definite description, as is shown in the following paradigm:
(16) Context: John, who is the syntax professor, is speaking to Mary, who is the semantics
professor.
a. #John is happy.
a'. I am happy.
b. #Mary is happy.
b'. You are happy.
c. #John's mother is happy.
c'. My mother is happy.
d. #Mary's mother is happy.
d'. Your mother is happy.
e. #The syntax professor is happy.
f. #The semantics professor is happy.
On the assumption that the speaker and hearer figure in the initial sequence of evaluation, these facts
follow straightforwardly from Non-Redundancy.  In (16)a we start out with a sequence jAˆmH (since
John is the speaker and Mary is the addressee). When the subject John is processed, the Treatment of
10
R-expressions requires that its denotation be added to the sequence of evaluation, which yields a new
sequence jAˆmHˆj. But the latter violates Non-Redundancy, since John appears twice. The same effect
is found in (16)b, where by the Treatment of R-expressions Mary is added to the initial sequence to
yield a new sequence jAˆmHˆm, which again violates Non-Redundancy8.
I note for completeness that Non-Redundancy applies not only to individual-denoting terms,
but also to time expressions. Thus in (17)a-b indexical reference to the time of utterance is
acceptable. By contrast, non-indexical reference as in  (17)c is deviant:
(17) [Uttered at 6:50pm]
a. Peter is at home
b. Peter is at home now
c. #Peter is at home at 6:50pm
This suggests that Non-Redundancy applies beyond the domain of individual-denoting expressions.
q Condition C: Basic Cases
Let us now see how Condition C effects are derived.  Consider the sentence Bill likes Bill.
First, the subject is processed, and its denotation Bill (i.e. b) is added to the initial sequence of
evaluation jAˆmH to yield  jAˆmHˆb. At this point no problem arises, since this new sequence does
obey Non-Redundancy. But as soon as the object is processed, Non-Redundancy is violated, since
another occurrence of Bill is added to the sequence, yielding jAˆmHˆbˆb, which is illicit:
(18) a. #Bill like Bill (said by John to Mary)
b. [[Bill like Bill]] w jAˆmH=[[like Bill]] w jAˆmHˆb=[[like]] w jAˆmHˆbˆb=# because jAˆmHˆbˆb violates
Non-Redundancy.
Exactly the same effect holds if the subject is replaced with a demonstrative pronoun he1 which
denotes Bill. As soon as the subject is processed, the rest of the derivation becomes indistinguishable
from that of (18), and Non-Redundancy ends up being violated once again:
(19) a. #He1 likes Bill (said by John to Mary, where he1 is a demonstrative pronoun denoting Bill)
b. [[He1 like Bill]] w jAˆmH=[[like Bill]] w jAˆmHˆD(he1)=[[like Bill]] w jAˆmHˆb=[[like]] w jAˆmHˆbˆb=#
because jAˆmHˆbˆb violates Non-Redundancy.
By contrast, no violation of Non-Redundancy occurs  in an utterance of Bill's teacher likes Bill,
analyzed for simplicity as The Bill teacher likes Bill (where we take teacher to be a 2-place
predicate). The key is that the VP hates Bill is evaluated under a sequence that contains Bill's teacher
but not Bill himself, with the result that Non-Redundancy is satisfied. This is illustrated in the
following partial derivation (a full derivation of an analogous example is found in Appendix III,
(ix)):
(20) a. Bill's teacher likes Bill, analyzed as
a'. The Bill teacher likes Bill  (said by John to Mary)
b. [[a']] w jAˆmH=[[like Bill]] wjAˆmHˆt=[[like]] wjAˆmHˆtˆb, with t=[[the Bill teacher]] w jAˆmH
By contrast, Bill likes Bills' teacher (analyzed as Bill likes the Bill teacher) will yield a violation of
Non-Redundancy. This is because as soon as the subject is processed, its value Bill is entered in the
sequence of evaluation, which now becomes jAˆmHˆb. All the elements that are in the scope of Bill
are evaluated under extensions of this initial sequence. As a result, when the second occurrence of
Bill is processed, it adds b to a sequence of the form jAˆmHˆbˆ..., yielding a sequence jAˆmHˆbˆ ...ˆb,
which violates Non-Redundancy.
One cautionary note is in order at this point. Binding conditions B and C have notorious
counterexamples, such as the one in (21), due to Reinhart:
(21)  (Who is this man over there?) He is Colonel Weisskopf (Reinhart & Grodzinsky (1993))
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If Condition C were applied blindly, the sentence would be predicted to be ungrammatical, since he
and Colonel Weisskopf  denote the same person. One line of analysis, due to Heim (1993), is to make
semantic values more fine-grained than is usual by introducing 'guises' or values of implicit
descriptions ('individual concepts') under which various denotations are apprehended. In the case at
hand the implicit descriptive content of he may be something like the man you just pointed at, which
is probably different from the usual descriptive content associated with Colonel Weisskopf. For this
reason the two expressions count as referentially distinct from the standpoint of the Binding Theory,
and Reinhart's problem can be solved.
This strategy can be adapted to the present framework. In a more elaborate version of our system
(one with a context parameter), we could include in the sequence of evaluation functions from
contexts to objects rather than simply objects. Thus the sequence of evaluation would contain the
values of (rigidified) descriptions rather than the described objects themselves9 (note that if we
wished to preserve the metaphor of the sequence-as-a-memory-register, we would have to say that
the sequence contains the descriptions rather than their values, since a memory register can contain
symbols but not what they denote). Of course once we make this move we open a Pandora's box -
why couldn't we always introduce different implicit descriptions to refer to a given individual, thus
circumventing any kind of binding-theoretic violation? To put it differently, why is He likes John
ever unacceptable with coreference, since he and John could in principle introduce different guises
that both denote  John? Clearly the use of implicit descriptions must be constrained. We could posit
tentatively that, in the unmarked case, there exists a canonical description which is the only one
under which a given individual may be denoted. Interestingly, Corblin (2002) has suggested a similar
constraint for overt descriptions10. His basic motivation can be illustrated by the following case.  If
you and I have both known John Smith since our days in graduate school, it will be odd to talk of
'Ann Smith's husband' or of 'the Harvard professor' even if John happens to be married to Ann or to
be the only Harvard professor around. In most cases 'John' (or a pronoun) is the only term with
which we may naturally refer to him11. The hope is that a constraint of this sort could be motivated
for implicit descriptions as well. Interestingly, the result we need can be obtained by appealing to
Maria Aloni's notion of a 'conceptual cover', which was designed to solve entirely different problems
(such as: quantification across attitudes, or the semantics of interrogatives). A conceptual cover is a
set of individual concepts such that, 'in each world, each individual constitutes the instantiation of
one and only one concept' (Aloni 2001 p. 64)12. We need to stipulate that, in the default case (though
not, say, when someone's identity is under discussion), objects are referred to through individual
concepts that belong to the same conceptual cover, so that for each individual there is one -and no
more than one- 'canonical description' for it. Needless to say, this point, which will be set aside in
what follows (except for a brief reappearance in Section 3), will have to be investigated in future
research.
q Condition C: Adding that-clauses13
As is well-known, Condition C effects also hold in sentences with embeddings, such as #Bill
claims that Bill runs. In order to give an analysis of  such examples, I need to say a bit more about
the semantics of attitude verbs. To keep things as simple as possible, I stick to the traditional notion
that the sentence Bill claims that Ann runs is true just in case Bill stands in the claim relation to the
set of worlds in which Ann runs. In the technical implementation, the rule in (22), which is entirely
standard, specifies that a that-clause denotes a function from possible worlds to truth values; while
(23) stipulates that that-clauses should be treated in the same way as R-expressions, in the sense that
their denotations should be added at the end of the sequence of evaluation. This naturally leads to the
rule of interpretation of attitude verbs given in (23):
(22) Rule for that-clauses
[[that j]] ws=lw' [[j]] w's
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(23) Treatment of R-expressions (revised): If a is a proper name,  a definite description,  a
demonstrative pronoun (i.e. a pronoun with a positive subscript), or a that-clause,
 [[ [a b] ]] ws =[[ [b a] ]] ws=[[b]] wsˆ[[a]]ws
(24) Interpretation of attitude verbs
If A is an attitude verb,  [[A]] ws =# iff s violates Non-Redundancy or the last two elements of s
are not an individual and a proposition respectively. Otherwise, [[A]] ws =1 iff s2ŒIw(A), where
s2 is the pair of the last two elements of s.
To illustrate briefly, consider the derivation of Bill claims that Ann runs (for simplicity I omit failure
conditions):
(25) a. Bill claims that Ann runs (said by John to Mary)
b. (It can be shown that [[a]] w jAˆmH≠#)
[[a]] w jAˆmH=[[claims that Ann runs]] w jAˆmHˆb=[[claims]] w jAˆmHˆbˆp
with p=[[that Ann runs]] w jAˆmHˆb=lw' [[Ann runs]] w'jAˆmHˆb
 =lw' [[runs]] w'jAˆmHˆbˆa=lw' aŒIw'(runs)
Hence [[a]] w jAˆmH=1 iff  bˆpŒIw(claims)
When Ann is replaced with Bill, the final sequence (written in bold) becomes jAˆmHˆbˆb, which of
course violates Non-Redundancy, as is desired14.
q A Deeper Motivation for Non-Redundancy?
At this point we have taken Non-Redundancy to be a primitive of the theory, albeit one that
appears to be motivated by the constraints we observed on the use of speaker- and hearer-denoting
terms. But is there a deeper motivation for this principle? There might be, although the following
argumentation is rather speculative (the impatient reader may skip to the next paragraph without any
empirical or formal loss).
 Consider any cognitive agent -call him Joe- in a natural environment. Joe must keep track of
the objects that he encounters, for instance to learn that they might pose a threat. Now contrast the
following two strategies that Joe might follow:
Strategy 1. Whenever a creature c is encountered, create a new file and include in it all the
information learned about c.
Strategy 2. Whenever a creature c is encountered: (a) check whether there already is a file for c; if so,
add the new information about c to that file; (b) otherwise, create a new file and add to it all the
information available about c.
It would seem that Strategy 2 is much more effective than Strategy 1, especially if Joe has memory
limitations. Suppose that on Occasion A Joe encountered a tall dark-haired man with a long knife,
and created a file F with the relevant information. Suppose further that on Occasion B Joe
encountered a tall dark-haired man who angrily shouted at him. Using Strategy 2, if the individual of
Occasion B looked sufficiently like that of Occasion A, Joe will not create a new file but will simply
add to file F the information that the very person who has serious means of destruction also happens
to hold a grudge against him. The inference that on future occasions that same individual should be
avoided at all costs is then easy to draw. By contrast, if Joe follos Strategy 1 he will have created two
files, one, say F1, with the information that a tall dark-haired man owns a long knife, and the other,
F2, with the information that a tall dark-haired man holds a grudge against him. The  crucial question
for Joe's survival, however, is: are the individuals of F1 and F2 one and the same? On future
encounters Joe may still look through all his files and try to determine whether F1 and F2 refer to one
and the same individual. Apart from the fact that it might not be optimal to perform this computation
online upon each new encounter, there will be a clear loss of information if Joe (like the rest of us)
suffers from partial memory loss.  On a later occasion all that might remain on file F2 might be: 'is a
tall man who holds a grudge against me', with the information missing that the very same man also
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has dark hair. This will make it difficult to infer that F1 and F2 refer to the same man, who should
hence be avoided. By contrast, much more information would have been available if the decision
whether the two men were one and the same had been made on Occasion B, when all the information
about the angry tall dark-haired man was still vividly available.
This little fable is designed to suggest that Non-Redundancy, i.e. the precept that no new
file/cell should be created if it refers to the same individual as an existing file, might be a general
cognitive principle rather than a narrowly linguistic one. (End of the speculations)15.
2 The Interpretation of Pronouns and Condition B
2.1 The Interpretation of Pronouns
q Anaphoric Pronouns
Given Non-Redundancy and our rule of interpretation for atomic predicates, we don't have much
leeway in the analysis of pronouns. Clearly, anaphoric pronouns cannot add a new element to a
sequence of evaluation, for this would immediately yield a violation of Non-Redundancy in a
sentence such as Bill likes his mother, where his denotes Bill. On the other hand it also won't do to
posit that anaphoric pronouns simply leave a sequence of evaluation unchanged, for given our rule of
interpretation for atomic predicates this would yield incorrect results for a sentence such as Bill
claims that Ann thinks that he runs: if run were simply evaluated under the sequence obtained after
Ann has been processed, we would obtain the value 'true' just in case run is satisfied by jAˆmHˆbˆa; as
a result, running would be attributed to the last member of that sequence, Ann, rather than to Bill -
not a desirable result.
The only natural solution is to posit that an anaphoric pronoun recovers an element that is
already in a sequence of evaluation and puts it at the end of that sequence. This can be implemented
in two ways:
(i) We could posit that sequences are reordered, i.e. that an element of position -i is literally 'moved'
to the end of the sequence. For instance when he-2 is processed under a sequence MaryˆJohnˆAnn,
the new sequence of evaluation would be MaryˆAnnˆJohn, where John has been moved from
position -2 to the last position.
(ii) Alternatively, we could stipulate that an element that is recovered leaves behind an empty cell.
Under this view when he-2 is evaluated under a sequence MaryˆJohnˆAnn, the new sequence
becomes Maryˆ#ˆAnnˆJohn, where '#' indicates that the position that John used to occupy is now
empty.
For reasons that will be discussed later, in the simplest implementation of our theory (ii) is
empirically superior to (i). Somewhat surprisingly, however, (i) becomes a viable option when
temporal anaphora is taken into account.  Adopting for the moment the solution in (ii), I state the
following preliminary rule of interpretation for non-demonstrative pronouns:
(26) Treatment of Non-Demonstrative Pronouns (preliminary)
If a is a pronoun pro-i, [[ [a b] ]]ws=[[ [b a] ]]ws=# iff s has strictly less than i elements.
Otherwise, for a possibly empty sequence s' and for some elements d1, ..., di,  s=s'ˆdiˆ...ˆd1 and
[[ [a b] ]]ws=[[ [b a] ]]ws= [[b]] w s'ˆ#ˆdi-1ˆ ...ˆd1ˆdi
A simple grammatical example is given below (the example involves an embedding because
otherwise the pronoun would be 'too close' to its antecedent, yielding a Condition B violation):
(27) a. Bill claims that he-1 runs
b. [[(a)]] w jAˆmH=[[claims that he-1 runs]] w jAˆmHˆb= [[claims]] w jAˆmHˆbˆp 
with    p=[[ that he-1 runs]] w jAˆmHˆb
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 =lw' [[he-1 runs]] w'jAˆmHˆb
 =lw' [[runs]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆb
 =lw' bŒIw'(runs)
Since no referential expression was processed between Bill and he-1, the effects of the rule are fairly
trivial in this case. Things become more interesting when an additional level of embedding is added,
as in the following, where Ann has been 'sandwiched' between Bill and he-2:
(28) a. Bill claims that Ann thinks that he-2 runs
b. [[a]] w jAˆmH=[[claims that Ann runs]] w jAˆmHˆb= [[claims]] w jAˆmHˆbˆp  
with    p=[[ that Ann thinks that he-2 runs]] w jAˆmHˆb
 =lw' [[Ann thinks that he-2 runs]] w'jAˆmHˆb
 =lw' [[thinks that he-2 runs]] w'jAˆmHˆbˆa
 =lw' [[thinks]] w'jAˆmHˆbˆaˆqw'
  with (for each w') qw'=q=[[that he-2 runs]] w'jAˆmHˆbˆa
  =lw"[[he-2 runs]] w"jAˆmHˆbˆa
   =lw"[[runs]] w"jAˆmHˆ#ˆaˆb
   =lw" bŒIw"(runs)
 =lw' aˆqŒIw'(thinks)
It can be shown that  [[a]] w jAˆmH≠#, and [[a]] w jAˆmH=1 iff bˆpŒIw(claims)
While this may look a bit complex, all that really matters for binding-theoretic purposes is the nature
of the sequences under which the various constituents are evaluated. The crucial step is indicated in
bold; the sequence jAˆmHˆbˆa is turned into jAˆmHˆ#ˆaˆb because a pronoun with index -2 was
processed, which moved the element in position -2 to the last position of the sequence, leaving
behind #. This derives the intended truth-conditions, since the property of running is now attributed
to Bill, and not to Ann, as would have been the case if b had not been moved in this way.
I note in passing that in the present system there is exactly one indexing that can make a
pronoun p coreferential with a c-commanding term t. This is because each constituent that is in the
scope of t is evaluated with respect to a sequence that contains a single occurrence of the denotation
of t - say, Peter.  Non-Redundancy prevents the pronoun p from introducing another occurrence of
Peter in the sequence, and hence p cannot bear a positive index (since pronouns with positive
indices, like other R-expressions, add their denotation to the sequence of evaluation). Thus p must
bear a negative index, and can denote Peter only if it bears an index that references the position
occupied by Peter in the sequence at the point where p is processed - for instance the index -3 if at
that point the sequence is jAˆmHˆpˆeˆa.  By this reasoning, he can refer to Bill in Bill thinks that he is
clever  only if it bears the index -1. This might seem unfortunate in view of the notorious existence of
an ambiguity in ellipsis resolution, for instance in Bill thinks that he is clever and Sam does too,
which may mean that Sam thinks that Bill is clever or that Sam thinks that Sam is clever.
Traditionally the ambiguity is blamed on the antecedent Bill thinks that he is clever, which is taken
to have distinct but logically equivalent logical forms. In Section 3 we will see how the ambiguity
can be derived in a purely semantic fashion.
q Indexical Pronouns
Indexical pronouns (I, you) can be incorporated into the present framework, with the provision that I
may only recover from a sequence an element that bears a superscript A, indicating that it is the
author of the speech act; and that similarly you may only recover an element that bears the
superscript H (for 'hearer'). By contrast, other pronouns may not recover such elements. The
necessary assumption has been stated explicitly in the Appendix III (under 'Adequacy'); its content
will be implicitly assumed in what follows. Apart from this, there is nothing special to say about
indexical pronouns. In particular,  they enter in the same kind of anaphoric relations as third person
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pronouns, except that due to the restriction we just discussed I and you may only recover from the
sequence elements that denote the author or the hearer respectively. A consequence of this analysis is
that, say, a first person pronoun p may be 'bound' by another first person pronoun p' that c-commands
it -or to put it in the terms of the present theory, p may bear the index -i if p' is the ith closest referring
expression that c-commands p. For instance in I think that I am sick the second I may bear the index
-1 (in fact, by the Locality of Variable Binding, to be discussed in Section 3, it must bear the index -
1).
The hypothesis that first and second person pronouns can be bound contradicts standard
treatments of indexicality, which assume that I and you take their value from a context parameter
rather than from an assignment function (Kaplan 1989). But the following facts, due (in a different
form) to Heim (1991), show that the standard treatment is incorrect, since first and second person
pronouns (unlike other indexicals) do give rise to bound variable readings in ellipsis:
(29) a. I did my homework. Sam did too.
Reading 1: Sam did Sam's homework.
Reading 2: Sam did my homework.
b. You did your homework. Sam did too.
Reading 1: Sam did Sam's homework.
Reading 2: Sam did your homework.
c. John did his homework .Sam did too.
Reading 1: Sam did Sam's homework.
Reading 2: Sam did John's homework.
While ellipsis resolution will be discussed in Section 3, we conclude for the moment that it is
desirable to give first, second and third person pronouns a unified treatment, and thus to allow them
all to bear a negative indices.
2.2 The Derivation of Reinhart & Reuland's Version of Condition B
q Basic Observation
We are now in a position to derive a version of Condition B. The initial observation is that
Bill likes him cannot normally mean that Bill likes Bill. In the present framework this follows
because (a) by Non-Redundancy, there can be no more than one occurrence of Bill in the sequence
of evaluation, but (b) the interpretive rule for likes requires that the last two positions of the sequence
be occupied by Bill if the sentence is to have the intended interpretation. This tension is illustrated in
(30) (Bill likes him), which is evaluated under a sequence s. We may then reason as follows:
-Bill adds b to the sequence, yielding sˆb. The pronoun him cannot refer deictically to Bill, as this
would add another occurrence of Bill in the sequence, yielding sˆbˆb, which violates Non-
Redundancy. Thus if him is to corefer with Bill, it must bear a negative index, in fact the index -1.
-But this does not give the intended truth-conditions, as shown in the following derivation:
(30) a. #Bill likes him-1 (evaluated under a sequence s)
b. [[Bill likes him-1]] w s
=[[likes him-1]] w sˆb
=[[like]] w sˆ#ˆb
=# since like is transitive and one of the last two elements of the sequence (namely element -2)
is #.16
This example also provides an empirical argument in favor of the version of the Treatment of Non-
Demonstrative Pronouns that we decided upon. The alternative, it will be recalled, was to posit that a
pronoun with index -i simply moves the element of position -i to the end of the sequence without
leaving behind an empty cell. With such a rule we could still derive the result that Bill likes him
cannot possibly mean that Bill likes Bill. But we would also obtain the undesirable result that if him
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bears the index -1 the sentence might come to mean that Charles likes Bill, in case Charles figured at
the end of the original sequence (for instance because the entire sentence was Charles believes that
[Bill likes him-1]). This unfortunate result is illustrated in (31).
(31) What goes wrong with an alternative treatment of pronouns
a. #Bill likes him-1
b. [[Bill likes him-1]] w...ˆc
=[[likes him-1]] w ...ˆcˆb
=[[like]] w...ˆcˆb
=1 iff cˆbŒIw(likes)
Even when one has stopped laughing, it isn't clear how the problem can be fixed given this simple
framework. But we will see that as soon as temporal anaphora is taken into account the problem can
in fact be circumvented (this alternative is discussed in Section 4).
As expected, Condition B violations disappears when there is more 'distance' between the
pronoun and its antecedent. The requirement is simply that these should never be coarguments of the
same atomic predicate, a condition satisfied in (32):
(32) a. Bill claims that he-1 runs (said by John to Mary)
b. [[a]] w jAˆmH=[[claims that he-1 runs]] w jAˆmHˆb=1
=[[claims]] w jAˆmHˆbˆp
 with p =[[that he-1 runs]] w jAˆmHˆb=lw' [[he-1 runs]] w'jAˆmHˆb
 =lw' [[runs]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆb=lw' bŒIw'(runs)
=1 iff  bˆpŒIw(claims)
One exception is worth pointing out, however. In 'exceptional case marking' (ECM) constructions,
the subject of the embedded clause appears to be 'close enough' to the superordinate subject to create
a Condition B effect:
(33) a. Bill believes himself/*him to be clever.
b. Pierrei sei/*lei croit intelligent.
    Pierrei himselfi/*himi believes intelligent
For these and related constructions (e.g. A-movement with seem), we have no choice but to claim
that either directly or through a rule of restructuring, the embedded subject is in fact an argument of
the matrix verb. Unless this move can be made plausible the entire analysis of Condition B is
threatened. Preliminary remarks on possible solutions are included in Appendix I.
q Relation to Reinhart & Reuland's theory
As it stands, the present theory predicts that two arguments of the same predicate cannot denote the
same object. This is in essence Reinhart & Reuland's version of Condition B, which states that 'a
(semantically) reflexive predicate must be reflexive-marked', i.e. be either (a) lexically reflexive, or
else (b) be followed by a zelf-element. This theory has serious problems, even with respect to Dutch-
like languages (see for instance Bergeton (2003) for a recent critique of Reinhart & Reuland's theory,
based in particular on Danish). But to the extent that it is a major contender in the theory of
reflexivity it is interesting to note that the present theory derives this condition, which for Reinhart &
Reuland (as well as for competing frameworks) must be stipulated.
3 The Locality of Variable Binding and Ellipsis Resolution
q Denotational Economy and Truth-conditional Economy
Any theory in which binding is a non-transitive relation between two expressions has to
supplement the classic version of Condition B ('a pronoun may not be bound locally') with a
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principle that requires local binding in certain configurations. Otherwise Bill claims that he hates
him would be predicted to have a grammatical reading on which he is bound non-locally by Bill, and
thus denotes Bill as well. Thus although the binding pattern displayed in (34)a is correctly blocked
by Condition B, we must still ensure that an additional principle (which we will 'Locality of Variable
Binding', following Fox (2000)) blocks (34)b as well:
(34)         Bill claims that he hates him
a.   (...ruled out by Condition B)
b.  (...ruled out by the Locality of Variable Binding)
The intuition that has been pursued in the literature is that the binding pattern in (34)b is disallowed
because him is bound non-locally by Bill even though local binding by he would yield the same
semantic result (... if local binding were possible, that is; it is clear that the condition must be
checked before Binding Conditions have had a chance to rule out (34)a). The general idea, then, is
that local binding is more 'economical' and hence preferable to non-local binding. However there are
two ways to interpret the relevant notion of economy. Truth-conditional economy (Reinhart 1983,
Heim 1993, Fox 2000, Büring 2002) stipulates that local binding must be preferred unless non-local
binding yields different truth-conditions. By contrast, Kehler (1993) argues for a principle of
denotational economy, which requires local binding unless non-local binding yields a different
denotation for the bound pronoun. To put it loosely, truth-conditional economy is 'smart' and looks at
the interpretation of an entire clause, whereas denotational economy is 'dumb' and considers only the
interpretation of a referential expression:
(35) Truth-conditional vs. Denotational economy
a. Truth-conditional economy (modified from Büring 2002)
For any two NPs a and b, if a could bind b  (i.e. if it c-commands b and b is not bound in a's
c-command domain already), a must bind b, unless this changes the truth conditions of the
entire sentence.
b. Denotational economy (cf. Kehler 199317)
For any two NPs a and b, if a could bind b  (i.e. if it c-commands b and b is not bound in a's
c-command domain already), a must bind b, unless this changes the denotation of b
Although truth-conditional and denotational economy do not in general make the same predictions,
they both rule out (34)b.
 As it turns out, the present theory predicts that Denotational Economy should always be
satisfied. Crucially, and unlike what is the case in other theories, Economy is not an autonomous
principle; rather, it follows from the very architecture of the system - nothing needs to be added to
obtain Kehler's prediction. Let us now see why. As was observed earlier, in the present framework
there is at most one indexing that makes a pronoun coreferential with a given expression that c-
commands it. Furthermore, if three  coreferential expressions are in a c-command relation of the
form [... A... p1... p2], where A c-commands p1, p1 c-commands p2, and both  p1 and p2 are pronouns
(the only grammatical possibility, by Non-Redundancy), p2 must bear the index -i if p1 is the ith
referential expression from p2. More concretely, (36)a can yield a reading on which his denotes John
only if his bears the index -1:
(36) a. OkJohn claims that he-1 believes that he-1 isn't good enough
b. *John claims that he-1 believes that he-2 isn't good enough
The indexing in (36)b would in fact result in ungrammaticality. An initial sequence of evaluation s
will be turned into sˆj after John has been processed, and then into sˆ#ˆj after he-1 has been processed.
At that point an attempt to interpret he-2  will yield a failure, since the element in position -2 is #.
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Going back to John claims that he hates him, we can now see that on any indexing for him the
sentence will result in a semantic failure:
(37) a. John claims that he-1 hate him-1 => uninterpretable (Condition B)
b. John claims that he-1 hate him-2 => uninterpretable (Denotational Economy)
Suppose the initial sequence of evaluation is s. Whether the indexing is as in (37)a or (37)b, the new
sequence of evaluation after John has been processed must be sˆj, which in turn is transformed into
sˆ#ˆj after he-1 has been processed. If him bears the index -1, ungrammaticality results because hate is
evaluated under a sequence sˆ#ˆ#ˆj, which has # in one of its last two positions. If on the other hand
him bears the index -2, hate is evaluated under a sequence sˆ#ˆjˆ#, which again yields a semantic
failure (here too # is found in one of the last two positions). This is precisely the result that we want.
q Bound vs. Strict Readings in Ellipsis
Since the empirical arguments in favor of the Locality of Variable Binding stem from an
analysis of ellipsis resolution, I should say a word about how the latter is handled in the present
system.
It is often argued that a sentence such as Peter claims that he runs has two possible syntactic
representations that both yield a coreferential reading. In one of them, he is a variable bound by
Peter (or by a l-abstractor that immediately follows Peter); in the other he is a free variable that
happens to denote Peter. This analysis is motivated by the observation that an ambiguity arises in
some elided clauses: Peter claims that he runs and Sam does too may entail that Sam claims that
Peter runs (strict reading), or that Sam claims that Sam runs (sloppy reading). On the ambiguity
view, the elided conjunct is read as 'sloppy' if its antecedent has a Logical Form in which the
pronoun is bound (e.g. by a l-abstractor, as in (38)a);  and it is read as 'strict' otherwise:
(38) a. Peter lx x claims that hex runs. Sam does too lx x claims that hex runs.
fi Sam claims that Sam runs (=sloppy reading)
b. Peter lx x claims that hey runs. Sam does too lx x claims that hey runs.,
where y denotes Peter
fi Sam claims that Peter runs (=strict reading)
In the present theory, by contrast, the strict/sloppy distinction cannot be represented syntactically,
for the simple reason that for any coreferential reading involving c-command there is a single
indexing that can represent it. Is this a problem? No, because in any event the ambiguity theory does
not suffice to account for all the facts; and (a version of) the additional mechanism that is needed
anyway turns out to be sufficient to derive the strict/sloppy distinction without a syntactic ambiguity
in the first place. The following examples, originally due to Dahl (1973), show that in a sequence of
two elided VPs the first one may be read as sloppy even though the second is read as strict (as before
I have followed Fox's convention and indicated in angle brackets the intended reading of the deleted
material):
(39) a. Max thinks he is strong, Oscar does, too <think that Oscar is strong>, but his father doesn't
<think that Oscar is strong>. (Fiengo & May 1994 p. 131)
b. Smithers thinks that his job sucks. Homer does, too <think that Homer's job sucks>.
However, Homer's wife doesn't <think that Homer's job sucks> (Fox 2000 p. 117)
c. John revised his paper, and Bill did too <revise Bill's paper>, although the teacher didn't
<revise Bill's paper> (Hardt 2003).
If the antecedent has a 'sloppy' syntactic representation, then both elided VPs should be sloppy as
well; on the other hand if it has a 'strict' representation, both elided VPs should be strict. The mixed
case which is in fact observed (the second clause is read as sloppy, and the third as strict with respect
to the second) is ruled out by the ambiguity theory. An additional stipulation is thus needed. Fox
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(2000), followed by Büring (2002), postulates in essence that an elided element can bear a different
index from its antecedent, as long as a condition of parallelism is respected.  It is then decreed that an
elided element may be parallel to its antecedent either by displaying the same anaphoric
dependencies, or by having the same referential value. Thus the reading described in (39)c is
presumably represented as in (40): the second conjunct is syntactically parallel to the first (the l-
abstract has been literally copied); the third conjunct is not syntactically parallel to the second, since
the index of his  has been changed from x to y. However if y denotes Bill, hisy is in fact semantically
parallel to hisx because it has the same referential value.
(40) John  lx x revised hisx paper, and Bill did too lx x revised hisx paper,
although the teacher didn't lx x revised hisy paper.
Once 'referential values' are appealed to in this fashion, we might as well make them do all the
work. Here I will simply suggest that in the course of ellipsis resolution an elided pronoun may
optionally introduce in the sequence the value that its antecedent did. To put it differently, an elided
pronoun with index -i can optionally replace 'at the last minute' the element it is 'supposed' to bring
to the last position of the sequence of evaluation with the element that its antecedent had recovered
when the corresponding element of the unelided clause was processed. This is admittedly an
outright, brutal and ugly stipulation, but as far as I can tell it is not worse than the stipulation that
other theories need anyway. To illustrate the basic mechanism, consider the interpretation of Bill
claims that he runs, followed by the two possible interpretations of Sam does too (again I omit
failure conditions):
(41) a. Bill claims that he-1 runs (said by John to Mary)
b. [[a]] w jAˆmH=[[claims that he-1runs]] w jAˆmHˆb=1
=[[claims]] w jAˆmHˆbˆp
 with p =[[that he-1 runs]] w jAˆmHˆb=lw' [[he-1 runs]] w'jAˆmHˆb
 =lw' [[runs]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆb=lw' bŒIw'(runs)
=1 iff  bˆpŒIw(claims)
(42) Sam does too claim that he-1 runs (said by John to Mary)
a. Sloppy reading: recover the syntactic form of the antecedent, and interpret it in the normal
way. The interpretation is like (41)a, with Sam replacing Bill and s replacing b.
b. Strict reading: recover the syntactic form of the antecedent, and when he-1 is processed add
to the sequence the value that its antecedent had recovered from the sequence in  the course of
the interpretation of the antecedent clause.
 [[(a)]]strict w jAˆmH =[[claim that he-1 runs]] strict w jAˆmHˆs=1
=[[claims]] strict w jAˆmHˆsˆp
 with p =[[that he-1  runs]] strict w jAˆmHˆs=lw' [[he-1  runs]] strict w'jAˆmHˆs
 =lw' [[runs]] strict w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆb (deleting s and introducing in the sequence b,
which was in position -1 in the sequence jAˆmHˆb, i.e. in the sequence with respect to which the
antecedent pronoun was evaluated)
 =lw' bŒIw'(runs)
 =1 iff  sˆpŒIw(claims)
The crucial step is indicated in bold. In (42)b the pronoun he-1 starts by deleting the element that was
in position -1. But instead of adding that same element at the end of the sequence, it introduces the
element that was so introduced in the corresponding step of the interpretation of the antecedent,
shown in bold in (41)b. This derives the strict reading. While this is by no means a full account of
ellipsis, this sketch will suffice to make the point we need concerning the Locality of Variable
Binding.
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q Dahl's Puzzle [=Fiengo & May's 'Many Pronouns Puzzle']
Fox (2000) introduces his principle of Locality of Variable Binding in order to account, among other
things, for 'Dahl's puzzle' (also called the 'Many Pronouns Puzzle' by Fiengo & May 1994). The
puzzle is this:  if an elided pronoun p1 is resolved as strict, all the elided pronouns it c-commands
must be read as strict too. This is illustrated in the two pronoun case below:
(43) Max said he saw his mother, and Oscar did too. (Fiengo & May's (3) p. 130)
a. Ok sloppy - sloppy: Oscar said that Oscar saw Oscar's mother
b. Ok strict - strict: Oscar said that Max saw Max's mother
c. Ok sloppy - strict: Oscar said that Oscar saw Max's mother
d.  *strict - sloppy: Oscar said that Max saw Oscar's mother
Fiengo & May (1993) claim that the generalization holds when there are more pronouns, and they
give a procedure to construct all possible readings. Here are some examples, where a indicates that a
pronoun is read as strict while b indicates that it is read as sloppy:
(44) Available readings in ellipsis (Fiengo & May pp. 134-135) (Left-to-right order represents c-
command) a=pronouns read as strict; b=pronouns read as sloppy
2 pronouns 3 pronouns 4 pronouns 
a a a a a a a a a  
b a b a a  b a a a 
b b b b a b b a a 
 b b b b b b a 
 b b b b
According to Fiengo & May, the generalization holds only when the strict pronoun c-commands the
other pronouns. When there is no c-command relation, no readings are filtered out, as is illustrated
below (his does not c-command him, and thus him can be read as sloppy even when his is read as
strict):
(45) Max said his mother saw him, and Oscar did, too (Fiengo & May's (53) p. 156)
a. Ok sloppy - sloppy: Oscar said that Oscar's mother saw Oscar
b. Ok strict - strict: Oscar said that Max's mother saw Max
c. Ok sloppy - strict: Oscar said that Oscar's mother saw Max
d. Ok strict - sloppy: Oscar said that Max's mother saw Oscar
In essence, Fox 2000 derives the generalization by suggesting that the only binding relation
authorized in the antecedent of (43) is the one given in (46) (only the most local binding is allowed,
since long-distance binding would not modify the truth-conditions of this conjunct; note that it is
crucial in Fox's theory that economy be computed separately in each conjunct):
(46)   Max said that he saw his mother.
As a result, Fox's disjunctive definition of parallelism (an element may be parallel to its antecedent
by displaying the same syntactic dependencies or by having the same referential value) authorizes
the readings in (47)a-c, but crucially not that in (47)d:
(47) Oscar did too.
a. Oscar said that he saw his mother.
b. Oscar said that <Max> saw his mother
c. Oscar said that he saw <Max>'s mother.
d. *Oscar said that <Max> saw his mother.
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(47)a is allowed by syntactic parallelism. (47)b is allowed because <Max> (or rather, a pronoun he
with a new index, denoting Max) satisfies referential parallelism, while his satisfies syntactic
parallelism (it displays the same dependency as its antecedent). (47)c is allowed because he is
syntactically parallel to its antecedent, while <John> has the same reference as its antecedent. On
the other hand (47)d is correctly predicted to be ungrammatical: his isn't referentially parallel to its
antecedent, since it denotes Oscar, not Max. And it isn't syntactically parallel to its antecedent either,
since by economy the latter had to be bound locally.
Fox's result can be replicated in the present framework. There is no choice as to the Logical
Form of the elided part of (47), which is simply copied from the antecedent VP, yielding (48):
(48) Max said that he-1 saw his-1 mother. Oscar did too say that he-1 saw his-1 mother.
The various interpretive possibilities arise when different choices are made in the interpretive
component: for each elided pronoun either its 'normal' value or the value of its antecedent can be
added to the sequence of evaluation. This yields the following possibilities, where for simplicity I
have only represented the  crucial sequences rather than the entire derivations:
(49) Oscar did too say that he-1 saw his-1 mother.
a. Sloppy-sloppy reading: the normal interpretation process applies
sˆo
sˆ#ˆo
sˆ#ˆ#ˆo
b. Strict-strict reading: Max instead of Oscar is added to the sequence in the 2nd step.
sˆo
sˆ#ˆm  [he-1 deletes o; but instead of inserting it at the end of the sequence, it inserts the
element that its unelided countepart had recovered in the interpretation of the antecedent, i.e.
m]
c. Sloppy-strict reading: Max instead of Oscar is added to the sequence in the 3rd step
sˆo
sˆ#ˆo
sˆ#ˆ#ˆm   [his-1 deletes o; but instead of inserting o at the end of the sequence, it inserts the
element that its unelided countepart had recovered in the interpretation of the antecedent, i.e.
m]
d. *Strict-sloppy: cannot  be derived
As in Fox's and Kehler's systems, the unattested reading on which he is strict (=denotes Max) while
his is sloppy (=denotes Oscar) can simply not be derived. This is because the only way for he-1 to
denote Max is to introduce the value of its antecedent rather than its 'normal' value in the sequence of
evaluation. But then the rest of the sentence, saw his-1 mother, is evaluated with respect to the new
sequence sˆ#ˆm. There are then only two possibilities for the interpretation of his-1, which both yield
the same result:
(i) if nothing special is done, his-1 recovers the last element of sˆ#ˆm, and thus his denotes m.
(ii) alternatively, his-1 may recover the value of its unelided counterpart. But unelided his-1 denoted m
as well, so this gives exactly the same result as (i).
Thus not matter which choice is made, we obtain an across-the-board strict reading, as in (49)b18.
q Different Predictions
 Let us now come to predictions that discriminate between Truth-conditional and Denotational
Economy. Fox cites the following as evidence for Truth-conditional Economy (and against a
potential alternative based on Denotational Economy):
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(50) a. Everybody hates Lucifer. In fact, Lucifer knows very well that only he (himself) pities him.
b. Everybody hates every devil. In fact, every devil knows very well that only he (himself)
pities him. (Fox's (34) p. 124)
Fox's argument can be reconstructed as follows: In Lucifer knows very well that only he (himself)
pities him, the presence of only yields a truth-conditional difference between a representation in
which him is bound locally and one in which it is bound by Lucifer:
(51) a. Lucifer lx x knows very well that [only hex] ly y pities himy.
fiLucifer knows that Lucifer is the only person that has the property of pitying oneself.
b. Lucifer lx x knows very well that [only hex] ly y pities himx
fiLucifer knows that Lucifer is the only person that has the property of pitying Lucifer
Since the interpretation obtained in (51)b is not equivalent to that in (51)a, Truth-conditional
Economy does allow for non-local binding. By contrast, Denotational Economy predicts that
Condition B should be violated.
While Fox's analysis is appealing, there are two problems with it.
(i) First, many examples that Fox predicts to be good are in fact rather degraded. This is particularly
clear in French, where -for reasons that I do not understand- the clitics appear to make various
binding-theoretic effects much sharper (for instance internal to French there is a contrast between
*Tu vous aimes [you-sg you-pl. like] and ?Tu aimes VOUS [you-sg. like YOU-pl], where the object
in the latter example is not cliticized). In English (50)b is not clearly acceptable. But its French
counterpart is rather clearly ungrammatical, as shown in (52)a:
(52) a. *?Tout le monde déteste les diablotins. Chacun des diablotins sait d'ailleurs
         *?Everyone hates the little-devils. Each of the little-devils knows in-fact
pertinemment que lui seul l'aime.
very-well that he alone him likes
b. Ok ... que lui seul s'aime
Ok... that he alone himself likes
(Interestingly, and contrary to the predictions of every theory I know (including this one) (52)b
allows both for a strict and for a sloppy reading19).
(ii) Second, the examples that are good can be accounted for by appealing to a more fine-grained
semantics, in which not just the denotations but also the senses (the implicit descriptions under
which the objects are referred to) are included in the sequences of evaluation.
(53) a. (Who is this man over there?) He is Colonel Weisskopf (Reinhart & Grodzinsky 1993)
b. A: Is this speaker Zelda?
B: How can you doubt it? She praises her to the sky. No competing candidate would do that.
(Heim 1993)
As was mentioned earlier, the natural suggestion is that the same individual, say Weisskopf, is
denoted under different 'guises' - once as the person who is over there, and a second time as a well-
known colonel. Non-Redundancy is then violated just in case the same guise occurs in different cells
of the same sequence, which is not the case in (53).
  Once this mechanism is in place, it is tempting to use it to account for Fox's data as well. The
idea is that Lucifer knows very well that only he (himself) pities him is good to the extent that he and
him refer to Lucifer under different guises. Two arguments suggest that this line of explanation
might be correct.
(a) First, to the extent that Fox's only examples are acceptable, they can often be followed by
sentences without only that also obviate Condition B. To my ear the following have the same status
as Fox's original examples:
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(54) Presque tout le monde déteste Lucifer. En fait, Lucifer sait fort bien que lui seul l'aime.
   Almost everybody hates Lucifer. In fact, Lucifer knows perfectly well that only he likes him
 'Aimer' est d'ailleurs un terme qui est trop faible: il l'adore.
'like' is in fact a term which is  too weak: he adores him
In each case the last sentence (printed in bold) appears to be as acceptable as the sentences that
precede it. But since the last sentence does not include only, there is no way non-local binding could
make any difference to its interpretation. To the extent that the last sentence is acceptable, one is
presumably forced to posit that the two pronouns refer to the same individual under different guises,
so that Condition B is not violated in the end. But if such an assumption is needed for the last
sentence, why could it not also explain the acceptability of the preceding sentences? It seems that
'guises' are all we need to account for Fox's data.
(b) Additional evidence might be provided by the behavior of plural pronouns. Note that whenever a
single individual is presented under different guises, a plural expression may be used to assert that
these guises pick out the same object. If I see someone a mirror, and then see the same person
standing in the distance, I may say: They are one and the same! With this observation in mind, it is
interesting to consider the tentative generalization in (55), which is illustrated in (56):
(55) Whenever two singular coreferential expressions E1 and E2 are in a configuration that should
trigger a Binding Theory violation but doesn't, E1 and E2 can be followed (often with an ironic
overtone) by a plural pronoun P that refers to the (unique) denotation of E1 and E2. In other
words, for purposes of computing plurality, E1 and E2 count as distinct.
(56) a. ?Pierre déteste Anne, Jean déteste Anne, François déteste Anne également - mais bien
entendu Anne ne déteste pas Anne (il faut dire qu'elles ont beaucoup de choses en commun).
P. hates A., J. hates A., F. hates A. too - but of course A. doesn't hate A (unsurprisingly, since
they have a lot in common)
b. Pierre déteste Anne, Jean déteste Anne, François la déteste aussi - seule Anne ne la déteste
pas (il faut dire qu'elles ont beaucoup de choses en commun)
P. hates A., J. hates A., F. hates her too - only A. doesn't hate her (which is unsurprising, since
they have a lot in common)
c. ... Anne ne se déteste pas (#il faut dire qu'elles ont beaucoup de choses en commun).
... A. doesn't hate herself (#which is unsurprising, since they have a lot in common)
(57) a. Tout le monde déteste Lucifer.  Même Lucifer déteste Lucifer. (Il faut dire qu'ils ont déjà eu
maille à partir.)
Everybody hates Lucifer. Even Lucifer hates Lucifer. ( It should be added that they have
already had problems (=with each other))
 b. Tout le monde déteste Lucifer. Même Lucifer le déteste. (Il faut dire qu'ils ont déjà eu
maille à partir.)
Everybody hates Lucifer. Even Lucifer hates him.  (It should be added that they have already
had problems (=with each other))
c. Tout le monde déteste Lucifer. Même Lucifer se déteste. (#Il faut dire qu'ils ont déjà eu
maille à partir.)
Everybody hates Lucifer. Even Lucifer hates himself. (#It should be added that they have
already had problems (=with each other))
In (56) and (57) a. obviates Condition C, b. obviates Condition B violation, while c. satisfies
Condition A and thus includes a reflexive pronoun. To the extent that a. and b. are acceptable, they
can relatively easily (though with a somewhat ironic overtone) be followed by a plural pronoun
which in fact refers to a single individual, presumably under two guises. This is entirely impossible
in c. The natural explanation is that the sentences in a. and b. are in fact acceptable because the same
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individual is denoted under different guises, which (i) obviates Conditions B and C, and (ii) makes it
possible to use a plural pronoun to refer to a single individual20. However if this explanation is on the
right track, an analysis based on guises suffices to account for the data, and there is no need for a rule
of Truth-conditional Economy .
Preliminary evidence (based on three American speakers) suggests that (55) might hold for
English as well. As for (54), judgments differ, and some speakers finding that similar sentences tend
to become worse when the sentence in bold is added. If so the facts in  (55) would favor the present
theory, and those in (54) Fox's. Needless to say much more empirical work is needed to settle the
issue.21,22
4 Temporal Anaphora and a Simpler Alternative
In the preceding sections issues of temporal semantics were entirely disregarded. Rather
unsurprisingly, temporal anaphora can easily be incorporated to the present framework. What is
more surprising, however, is that temporal anaphora also allows for a simplification of the system,
though with some subtle differences whose consequences are not yet entirely clear. In a nutshell,
incorporating tense allows us to get rid of the device of 'empty cells', which was hitherto crucial to
obtain failure when Condition B was violated.
Consider first the sentence Bill liked Charles.  Following a long tradition initiated by Partee
(1973), we treat tense as a time-denoting pronoun, whose reference is giving deictically in this case.
In addition to its two individual arguments Bill and Charles, the verb like will now take a temporal
argument, which we write as T1, with the assumption that T1 denotes a salient past moment t' (if the
tense were indexical or anaphoric, T would carry a negative index). Assuming that the time of
utterance (like other coordinates of the speech act) is represented in the initial sequence of evaluation
as tU, we obtain the following derivation:
(58) a. Bill liked Charles
a'. [T1 [Bill [like Charles]]]
b. [[ a' ]] w tUˆjAˆmH
=[[ [Bill [like Charles]] ]] w tUˆjAˆmHˆt'
=[[ [like Charles] ]] w tUˆjAˆmHˆt'ˆb
=[[ like]] w tUˆjAˆmHˆt'ˆbˆc
=1 iff t'ˆbˆcŒIw(like)
So far, so good - as long as the denotation of like at a world w is a set of triples of the form
timeˆindividual1ˆindividual2, the correct truth conditions are predicted. Now consider the sentence
Bill liked him, where him is intended to denote Bill. We wish to derive a semantic failure to account
for the Condition B effect. We could of course resort to the procedure of empty cells, as we did in
the preceding sections. In this way we would end up evaluating like under the sequence
jAˆmHˆtUˆt'ˆ#ˆb, and the desired failure would follow right away. But the same result can also be
derived in a more elegant fashion. Suppose that anaphoric pronouns simply move the elements they
recover to the end of the sequence, without replacing them with empty cells in their original position
(this is the alternative theory that we considered and rejected when we discussed the treatment of
indexical and anaphoric pronouns).  In this new system we obtain the following derivation:
(59) a. #Bill liked him-1
a'. [T1 [Bill [like him-1]]]
b. [[ a' ]] w tUˆjAˆmH
=[[ [Bill [like him-1]] ]] w tUˆjAˆmHˆt'
=[[ [like him-1] ]] w tUˆjAˆmHˆt'ˆb
=[[ like]] w tUˆjAˆmHˆt'ˆb
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In the line written in bold, the pronoun him-1 had the effect of (i) recovering the element in position
-1, namely b, and (ii) bringing it to the last position, without replacing it with #. Because b was
already in the last position of the sequence, the net effect was to leave the sequence of evaluation
unchanged. But now when we come to the last step of the interpretation procedure, we have to
evaluate like with respect to a sequence whose last three elements are mHˆt'ˆb. It is natural to assume
that a semantic failure is triggered at this point, because like wants to be evaluated under a sequence
whose last three elements are of the form timeˆindividual1ˆindividual2. In mHˆt'ˆb the time argument
is in the 'wrong place', so to speak - it should be in position -3, but because the anaphoric pronoun
he-1 failed to introduce a 'new' individual argument in the sequence, t' ends up being in position -2. In
this way a failure is correctly derived without the device of empty cells.
This result holds quite generally. Consider an atomic predicate p which takes t  as its
temporal argument, and which in addition expects n individual arguments. When none of the
individual arguments of p  are coreferential, p will in the end be evaluated under a sequence of the
form ....ˆdˆt'ˆd1ˆ ...ˆdn, where t' is the denotation of t. On the other hand if one of the individual
arguments of p is anaphoric on one of the others, it will fail to introduce a new individual in the
sequence, and thus in the end the predicate will be evaluated under a sequence of the form ...ˆdˆt'ˆd1,
...ˆdn-1. But now the time argument of the predicate is necessarily in the wrong position - it should be
in position -(n+1) but is in fact in position -n, which triggers a semantic failure.
This analysis can be extended to Condition B effects that apply within a Noun Phrase. As was
noted by a number of researchers, nouns, just like verbs, appear to have a time argument. The main
observation the latter may be evaluated independently of the tense of the clause it appears in (Enç
1987). Take for instance the sentence The fugitives are now in jail, due to Enç. If fugitive were
evaluated with respect to the same time as the predicate be in jail, a contradiction would be obtained
(since a a person cannot both be a fugitive at t and be in jail at t), contrary to fact. Enç's suggestion
was that fugitive has a concealed time argument, which behaves very much like a pronoun. In this
case this temporal pronoun is interpreted deictically, so that the sentence means something like: the
people who were fugitive at t are now in jail. Enç's conclusion was that nouns too take a time
argument. Assuming further that this time argument appears in the highest position in the noun
phrase, we can account for Condition B effects in noun phrases, e.g. in #John's worry about him-1  is
excessive. A semantic failure is triggered because worry needs its time argument to come before its
two individual arguments at the end of the sequence of evaluation. But when one of the individual
arguments is anaphoric on the other, the time arguments ends up in the 'wrong' position, as is
desired..
5 Quantification and Crossover Constraints23
As it stands, our theory encounters a serious problem with quantification - it incorrectly predicts
that a sentence such as Ed thinks that every professor is underpaid cannot attribute to Ed the thought
that every professor including Ed himself is underpaid (Daniel Büring, p.c.). The problem is real, and
a stipulation is needed to solve it; but this stipulation also yields a direct account of Weak and Strong
Crossover, as well as of the difference between them.
To understand what the issue is, let us see how quantification could naturally be incorporated to
the present framework. Assuming with several standard theories that quantifiers take scope by
undergoing 'Quantifier Raising', we could posit the following rule for every (again I omit failure
conditions):
(60)  [[ [[every N'] I']]] w s=1 iff for each d satisfying [[ N']] w sˆd=1, [[ I' ]] w sˆd=1
Similarly we could decide to treat traces in exactly the same way as  pronouns. If we followed this
course we would obtain the following derivation for Every professor is underpaid:
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(61) a.[[Every professor] [t-1 is underpaid]]
b. [[a]] w s=1 iff for each d such [[professor]] w sˆd=1, [[t-1 is-underpaid]] w sˆd=1
iff for each d such dŒIw(professor) , [[is-underpaid]] w sˆ#ˆd=1
iff for each d such dŒIw(professor), dŒIw(is-underpaid)
Unfortunately, if Non-Redundancy is checked with respect to each of the many sequences that enter
in the truth-conditions of (61), we must predict that Ed thinks that every professor is underpaid
cannot mean that Ed thinks that every professor including himself is underpaid. The reason for this is
that once Ed has been processed every professor is underpaid must be evaluated as in (61), but under
an initial sequence of the form s=s'ˆe where e is Ed. As a result, for d=e Non-Redundancy is violated,
contrary to what we want.
This problem suggests that the elements that are introduced by a quantifier do not appear in
the sequence of evaluation, but in a different sequence, which we will call the 'quantificational
sequence', and which is not itself subject to Non-Redundancy (for otherwise the same problem could
be recreated with more complex examples, e.g. Everybody loves everybody, which certainly requires
that love be evaluated at some point with respect to a sequence that contains two instances of John24).
Since the elements of the quantificational sequence must in the end play a role in the evaluation of
predicates, the sequence of evaluation must have a way to cross-reference them. We assume that
traces of quantifiers perform this function, by introducing in the sequence of evaluation indices that
cross-reference cells of the quantificational sequence (thus traces play a role which is very different
from that of pronouns). This mechanism solves the above problem, but it also explains why there are
Crossover effects. The heart of the matter is that the effect of a quantifier is now decomposed into
two separate steps, which are conflated in standard treatments:
-Introduction step: when a quantifier is evaluated with respect to a sequence of evaluation s and a
quantificational sequence q, it leaves s unchanged but turns q into qˆd for each object d that is
quantified over.
-Cross-reference step: when a trace indexed with the quantifier is processed, an index i is introduced
in the sequence of evaluation which indicates which cell of the quantificational sequence must be
retrieved.
-If necessary, there can then be further anaphoric steps, with garden-variety pronouns. The index i is
then treated as any other object found in the sequence of evaluation. If the trace is followed by a
pronoun with index -1, the sequence of evaluation is turned from sˆi into sˆ#ˆi, as is required by the
rule of interpretation of anaphoric pronouns. Crucially, if the anaphoric step precedes the cross-
reference step, the pronoun will try to retrieve from the sequence of evaluation an object which is not
there yet (since it is only after the trace has been processed that the index i is added to the sequence
of evaluation). This, in a nutshell, is our account of Weak Crossover effects: pronouns can be
affected by quantifiers only after a trace has introduced in the sequence of evaluation an index that
cross-references the relevant cell of the quantificational sequence.
5.1 Separating Quantification from Anaphora: Weak Crossover Effects
q Basic examples
Let us make this analysis more precise. To start with an example, consider what happens in
the new system when Every man is mortal is evaluated under a sequence of evaluation s and an
empty quantificational sequence. We adopt the same notation as before to encode dependencies
between traces and their antecedents: t-1 indicates that the trace is bound by the closest potential
binder, i.e. by the closest quantifier, t-2 by the second closest, etc25. In addition, the empty sequence is
written as ø. Thus  [[a]] w s, ø indicates that a is evaluated with respect to the sequence of evaluation s
and the empty quantificational sequence.
(62) a. [Every man] [t-1 is mortal]
b. [[a]] w s, ø=1 iff
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   [Step 1] for each d such [[man]] w s, ø=1, [[t-1 is-mortal]] w  s, ø=1
iff [Step 2] for each d such dŒIw(man), [[is-mortal]] wsˆ1, d=1
iff  [Step 3] for each d such dŒIw(man),  d ŒIw(is-mortal)=1
Consider the evaluation of the nuclear scope t-1 is mortal. In the first step, for each individual d
which satisfies the restrictor (i.e. for each d which is a man), d is added to the quantificational
sequence. Then in the second step an index is added to the sequence of evaluation to cross-reference
the corresponding element of the quantificational sequence (here the index is 1, because there is a
single element in the quantificational sequence). Then this information is used to evaluate the atomic
predicate is-mortal. Essentially the same thing happens for the restrictor, except that there is no need
to indicate which element of the quantificational sequence must be retrieved, because a noun is
always evaluated with respect to the element introduced by its determiner.
Before we get into further technicalities, let us see what goes wrong in an example that
involves Weak Crossover. As before, the quantifier introduces an element in the quantificational
sequence. But as long as the trace hasn't been processed, this element cannot be recovered by a
pronoun, whose search domain is the sequence of evaluation, not the quantificational sequence. Thus
we can get as far as the interpretive step given in (63)b:
(63) a. ??His mother likes every man
a'. [Every man] [[the [he-i mother]] [likes t-1]]
b. [[a']] w s, ø=1 iff for each d such [[ man]] w s, d=1, [[ [the [he-i mother]] likes t-1]] w s, d=1
No matter what the index of his-i/he-i is, the pronoun will not be able to recover the object d, for the
simple reason that d is not in the correct sequence. If on the other hand the trace t-1 had been
processed 'before' [his-i mother], i.e. in a position that c-commands it, there would have been no such
problem - his-i  could have retrieved an index that cross-referenced the relevant element of the
quantificational sequence, and the final truth-conditions would have been correct.
q Rules
I mention for completeness the rules that will be needed. I make the following assumptions
about the syntax/semantics interface:
(a) An operation of 'Quantifier Raising' applies before semantic interpretation. It brings the
quantifiers to their scope positions.
(b) The syntax is set up in such a way that the trace of a quantifier has the 'right' index, i.e. the index
that will allow it to be dependent on the quantifier that originated in its position. For instance, in the
structure [... Q ... Q'... t... t'...], where linear precedence represents c-command, I assume that if t is
the trace of Q and t' is the trace of Q', t bears the index -2 and t' bears the index -1.
(c) For each pair of a sequence of evaluation s and a quantificational q, an operation of n-resolution
is defined which picks out the last n elements of s, properly resolved in case they cross-reference
elements of the quantificational sequence q. The result is written as sn(q). The details of the
definition are left for Appendix III.
(64)  [[  [the n] ]] w s, q=# iff there is 0 or strictly more than 1 element x of X satisfying [[n]] w s, qˆx=1.
Otherwise, [[ [the n]]] w s, q=x for x satisfying [[ n]] w s, qˆx=1.
(65) If N is a noun taking n arguments, [[N]] ws, q=# iff s violates Non-Redundancy or sn-1(q)
contains # or |q|=0. Otherwise, [[N]] w s, q=1 iff q-1ˆ(sn-1(q))ŒIw(N)
To see how the analysis of definite descriptions works, let us consider the sentence The director
smokes.
(66) a. The director smokes
a'. [[the director] smoke]
b. [[a']] w s, q=[[smoke]] w s, qˆ[[the director]]ws, q
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[[the director]]ws, q=# iff there is 0 or more than 1 object d satisfying [[director]] w s, qˆd=1, i.e.
dŒIw(director). Otherwise, [[the director]] ws, q=d, where d satisfies [[director]] w s, qˆd=1, i.e.
dŒIw(director). Hence:
[[a']] w s, q=# iff there is 0 or more than 1 object d satisfying dŒIw(director) or there is exactly
one object d satisfying dŒIw(director) and that d is a member of s.
Otherwise, [[a']] w s, q=1 iff dŒIw(smoke) for dŒIw(director)
The analysis of quantifiers is  also straightforward - they simply manipulate elements that are added
at the end of the quantificational sequence.
(67) [[  [ [every n] e] ]] w s, q=# iff (i) for some x in X, [[n]] w s, qˆx=#, or (ii) for some x in X satisfying
[[n]] w s, qˆx=1, [[e]] w s, qˆx=#. Otherwise, [[  [ [every n] e] ]] w s, q=1 iff for each x in X satisfying
[[n]] w s, qˆx=1, [[e]] w s, qˆx=1.
(68) [[ [t-i b] ]] ws, q= [[ [b t-i] ]] ws, q= [[b]] wsˆ(|q|+1-i), q
To illustrate briefly, suppose that a trace t-1 is evaluated with respect to a sequence of evaluation s
and a quantificational sequence dˆd'. d' is the element introduced by the last quantifier, hence we
want t-1  to introduce in the sequence of evaluation an index that cross-references d'. For technical
reasons, we need to count from the beginning rather than from the end of the quantificational
sequence26. The index we need is thus 2 (=length(dˆd')-1+1). Similarly if t-2 were interpreted with
respect to a quantificational sequence dˆd'ˆd"ˆd'", it would cross-reference d", and hence would
introduce in the sequence of evaluation the index 3.
To be more concrete, here is a derivation of the truth conditions of Every student smokes:
(69) a. Every student smokes
a'. [[every student] [t-1  smoke]]
b. [[a']] w s, ø=# iff (for some xŒX, [[student]] w s, x=#) or (for some xŒX, [[student]] w s, x=1 and
[[smoke]] w s, x=#). None of these cases ever arises, and hence:
[[a']] w s, ø=1 iff for each xŒX satisfying [[student]] w s, x=1, [[t-1  smoke]] w s, x=1, iff
for each xŒX satisfying xŒIw(student), [[smoke]] w sˆ1 x=1, iff
for each xŒX satisfying xŒIw(student), (sˆ1)1(x)ŒIw(smoke) , iff
for each xŒX satisfying xŒIw(student), xŒIw(smoke).
q  A different prediction: referential expressions in an A'-position (Lasnik & Stowell's
Generalization)
In the introduction we summarized the generalization concerning Weak Crossover by  stating that a
pronoun may not be bound from a non-argument (A') position. The present system makes a slightly
different prediction, however, since it is the nature rather than the position of the binder that matters.
This is because the elements that must be treated through quantificational sequences are exactly
those that fail to yield violations of Non-Redundancy when one would otherwise expect them to. R-
expressions are clearly not in that group. As a result, we predict that R-expressions that bind a
pronoun from an A'-position should be perfectly acceptable. Lasnik & Stowell (1991) have argued
that this is in fact the case. They give the following example, which displays no Weak Crossover
effect in a sentence that clearly involves a pronoun bound by an R-expression (the availability of a
sloppy reading for the elided conjunct testifies that binding is really involved):
(70) This book I would never ask its author to read __, but that book I would __ (Lasnik & Stowell
1991)
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We further predict that in such cases the R-expression in the A'-position should trigger a Condition C
effect if it c-commands a coreferring R-expression. The facts are relatively clear in French for a
slightly different construction, and remain to be tested for English:
(71) a. <> John, John's mother loves
a'. *Himi, Johni's mother loves
b. John's mother loves John
a'. XX Jean, sa mère l'adore. Pierre, de même.
Jean, his mother him adores. Pierre, too.
b'. ??Jean, la mère de Jean l'adore.
Jean, the mother of Jean him adores.
In sum, we agree with Lasnik & Stowell's characterization of (that part of) the problem:
The only factor that correlates almost perfectly with the distribution of WCO effects is the intrinsic quantificational
status of the local A'-binder of the pronoun. A WCO effect seems to occur just when the pronoun and trace are
locally A'-bound by a true QP (or by a trace of a true QP). If the local A'-binder is either a referential NP
(topicalization) or an operator bound by an external antecedent (appositive relatives, tough-movement constructions,
and parasitic gap constructions), then there is no WCO effect. (Lasnik & Stowell 1991 pp. 704-705)
q Adding Relative Clauses
A word should be said about relative clauses, which interact with the analysis of Weak Crossover
effects.  The first of the following rules simply states that a relative clause is interpreted by
intersective modification, while the second states that the wh-element is semantically vacuous:
(72) a. [[N' RC]] ws, q=1 iff [[N']] ws, q=1 and [[RC]] ws, q
b. [[ [wh_ IP]]] ws, q=[[ IP]] ws, q
To illustrate, consider the interpretation of Every man who runs is mortal.  The key is that the
determiner every introduces an element x in the quantificational sequence (a different element x for
each object in the domain). It is only when the trace is processed that an index is introduced in the
sequence of evaluation to cross-reference x. With this procedure the correct truth-conditions are
easily derived:
(73) a. Every man who drinks smokes
a'. [Every [man who t-1 drink]] [t-1 smoke]
b. It can be shown that  [[(a)]] w s, ø≠# . Thus:
[[(a)]] w s, ø=1 iff for each x such that [[ [man [who [t-1 drink]]]]] w s, x=1, [[ [t-1 smoke]]] w s, x=1
iff for each x such that [[ man]] w s, x=[[ [who [t-1 drink]]]] w s, x=1, [[smoke]] w sˆ1, x=1
iff for each x such that [[ man]] w s, x=[[drink]] w sˆ1, x=1, [[smoke]] w sˆ1, x=1
iff for each x such that xŒIw(man) and (sˆ1)1(x) ŒIw(drink), (sˆ1)1(x) ŒIw(smoke),
iff for each d such that dŒIw(man) and dŒIw(drink), dŒIw(smoke)
Interestingly, we predict that restrictive relative clauses should give rise to Weak Crossover effects,
since it is only when the trace is processed that the element which is in the quantificational sequence
can be (indirectly) retrieved. Although the effects that are found are typically weaker than with
quantifiers or interrogatives, several researchers claim that they indeed exist. Thus Lasnik & Stowell
write: "Like Higginbotham 1980 and Safir 1986, we disagree with Chomsky's claim that WCO
effects are fully absent in restrictive relatives, even in examples like [(74)]":
(74) a. the mani [whoi [hisi mother loves ti]]
b. the booki [whichi [itsi author read ti]]
Lasnik & Stowell immediately add: "However, with appositive relative clauses, we (and the
literature) are in full agreement with Chomsky's judgment that there is no WCO effect":
30
(75) a. Gerald, who his mother loves, is a nice guy.
b. This book, which its author wrote last week, is a hit.
This fact can be accommodated in the present analysis. Since an appositive relative clause always
modifies a referring expression, the value of the latter, call it d, must be introduced in the sequence
of evaluation, not in the quantificational sequence. As a result, (i) a pronoun can retrieve that value if
it is contained in the relative clause, without triggering any Weak Crossover effect. Furthermore, (ii)
no R-expression denoting d can be found in the relative clause, as this would violate Non-
Redundancy.  Although there are differences across speakers, the predictions appear to be borne out
in English (and in French, replacing d. and e. with clitic left dislocation):
(76) a. (?) John's mother adores John
b. John, who his mother adores, had a very happy childhood
c. ?? John, who John's mother adores, had a very happy childhood.
d. John, his mother adores.
e. ?(?) John, John's mother adores.
The desired results can (almost) be achieved by defining the following rule of interpretation for
referential expressions modified by a relative clause. In essence the idea is simply that the relative
clause functions as a presupposition on the value of the referential expression. As argued above, the
relative clause itself is evaluated under a sequence of evaluation to which the value of the referential
expression has been added.
(77) [[ [r, RC]]] ws, q=[[ r]] ws, q iff [[RC]] wsˆ[[r]] ws, q=1. Otherwise [[ [r, RC]]] ws, q=#
There is a glitch, unfortunately. We must stipulate that in a non-restrictive relative clause the trace
left by the w h-element behaves like a pronoun, since otherwise it would seek its value in the
quantificational sequence rather than in the sequence of evaluation. At this point this must be
stipulated.
5.2 Weak vs. Strong Crossover
Why is Weak Crossover a relatively mild violation? Presumably because it allows for a repair
strategy. As a matter of fact, if the pronoun is interpreted as if it were a trace, the intended
interpretation can be obtained without semantic failure. Whether the repair occurs in the syntax or in
the semantics, its effect is to interpret (78)a as if it were (78)a", with the truth-conditions in (78)b(as
usual I treat his mother as the he mother, where mother is a dyadic predicate):
(78) a. Surface Structure: His mother likes every man.
a'. Actual LF: [Every man] [[the [he-2 mother]] likes t-1]
a". Repair: [Every man] [[the [t-2 mother]] [like t-1]]
b. It can be shown that [[a"]] w s, ø=# iff  (for some xŒX, xŒIw(man) and there is is 0 or more
than 1 x'ŒX satisfying: x'ˆxŒIw(mother)), or ((for every xŒX satisfying xŒIw(man), there is
exactly one x'ŒX satisfying x'ˆxŒIw(mother)) and (for some xŒX satisfying xŒIw(man), there is
exactly one x'ŒX satisfying x'ˆxŒIw(mother), and that x' also belongs to s)) [the latter
condition, which is baroque, is discussed in the next subsection].  Otherwise,
[[a"]] w s, ø=1 iff for each x such that [[man]] w s, x=1, [[[[the [he-2 mother]] like t-1]]] w s, x=1
iff for each xŒX such that xŒIw(man), for (the) x' satisfying [[t-2 mother]] w s, xˆx'=1, [[like t-1]]
sˆx', x=1,
iff for each xŒX such that xŒIw(man), for (the) x' satisfying [[mother]] w sˆ1, xˆx'=1, [[like]]
sˆx'ˆ1, x=1,
iff for each xŒX such that xŒIw(man), for (the) x' satisfying x'ˆxŒIw(mother), x'ˆxŒIw(like)
Suppose now that instead of a Weak Crossover violation we were dealing with a Strong
Crossover violation. We could attempt to apply the same repair strategy, thus turning (79)a into
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(79)a". But this time the repair will immediately trigger a violation of Non-Redundancy, since each
trace will introduce the same index (here: 1) in the sequence of evaluation, as is illustrated below:
(79) a. Surface Structure: He likes every man.
a'.  Actual LF: [Every man] [he likes t-1]
a". Repair: [Every man] [t-1 likes t-1]
b. [[(c)]] w s, ø=# iff for some xŒX such that [[man]] w s, x=1, [[ t-1 likes t-1]] w s, x =#,
iff for some xŒX such that [[man]] w s, x=1, [[likes t-1]] w sˆ1, x =#
iff for some xŒX such that [[man]] w s, x=1, [[likes]] w sˆ1ˆ1, s=#.
The latter condition is always met because sˆ1ˆ1 violates Non-Redundancy.
Thus we see that Strong Crossover effects can be analyzed as Weak Crossover effects that cannot be
repaired, except by violating Non-Redundancy. In essence we have just derived Chomsky's old
insight that a Strong Crossover violation is worse than a Weak Crossover violation because it adds to
it a violation of Principle C (in Chomsky's theory this was because traces were considered as R-
expressions). In effect we have followed the same intuition, since traces, like R-expressions,
systematically introduce an element in the sequence of evaluation. The difference between traces and
R-expressions is that the latter introduce 'normal' objects while the former introduce 'formal' objects,
that is, indices.
5.3 A Problem Regained?
At this point the structure of our argument can be summarized as follows:
(i) In order to avoid predicting that Ed thinks that every professor is underpaid cannot attribute to Ed
the thought that every professor including himself is underpaid, we must introduce quantified
elements in a separate sequence, the quantificational sequence (and furthermore the latter should not
be subject to Non-Redundancy).
(ii) The mechanism needed to cross-reference elements of the quantificational sequence accounts for
Weak and Strong Crossover effects.
It would appear, however, that the solution we adopted to solve the problem in (i) has displaced but
not eliminated the difficulty. To see this, consider the following examples:
(80) a. Every politician will say that his mother is wise.
a'. [Every politician] t-1 will say that [the [he-1 mother]] is wise.
b. Ann Smith knows that every politician will say that his mother is wise.
b'. Ann Smith knows that [every politician] t-1 will say that [the [he-1 mother]] is wise.
In both examples his mother  is analyzed as a definite description [the [he mother]], where he is
bound by the quantifier [every politician].  Now suppose that (80)a is uttered by Mary, whose son
happens to be a politician. Intuitively every politician may range over all the politicians in the
domain of discourse, including Mary's son. As a result, his mother may range over all the politicians'
mothers, including Mary herself. But the final version of the Treatment of R-expressions, copied
below, specifies that the denotation of a definite description is always added to the sequence of
evaluation (the final version of the rule is identical to that in  (23), except that the quantificational
sequence has been added as a parameter):
(81) Treatment of R-expressions (final): If a is a proper name,  a definite description,  a
demonstrative pronoun (i.e. a pronoun with a positive subscript), or a that-clause,
 [[ [a b] ]] ws, q =[[ [b a] ]] ws, q=[[b]] wsˆ[[a]]ws, q
As a result, at some point in the interpretation of Every politician will say that his mother is wise, we
find a sequence of evaluation of the form mAˆ ...ˆm (since Mary is the speaker and his  mother ranges
over all the politicians' mothers, including Mary), which violates Non-Redundancy. The prediction is
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that the sentence should be deviant, contrary to fact. The same problem can be replicated in (80)b,
independently of the identity of the speaker. If Ann Smith's son, Peter Smith, happens to be a
politician, his mother should again range, among others, over Ann Smith herself, which should yield
a violation of Non-Redundancy - again an incorrect result.
As it turns out, the problem can be solved by appealing once more to 'guises', whose nature
we have left a bit vague. If we wish to view them as model-theoretic objects, it is reasonable to think
of them as functions from pairs of the form <context, quantificational sequence> to individuals. Thus
a guise corresponding to the (rigidified) description the (actual) President of the US will introduce in
the sequence the function lc lq the x: x is the President of the US in the world of c. Similarly the
description introduced by an index 1 will be of the form lc lq the first coordinate of q, etc. In this
way, if the quantifier every politician in the above examples introduced an element in the first
position of the quantificational sequence,  his mother will introduce in the sequence of evaluation a
guise of the form lc lq the x: x is in the world of c the mother of the element found in the first
position of q. This description is certainly different from that corresponding to Mary in (80)a or that
corresponding to Ann Smith in (80)b. As a result, Non-Redundancy will not, in the end, be violated.
6 Disjoint Reference Effects
So far, we have only discussed constraints on coreference between singular terms. But the classic
theories of Chomsky and Lasnik were designed to account as well for restrictions on overlapping
reference when plural terms are involved.  As it stands our theory cannot handle these, but as we will
see shortly minor modifications of the analysis can accommodate them.
For Condition C the actual generalization is that the denotation of an R-expression may not
overlap with the denotation of an expression that c-commands it, as is illustrated by the following
examples from Lasnik (1989):
(82) a. *They told John to leave (* if they and John have overlapping reference)
b. *They told John to visit Susan    (* if they and John/Susan have overlapping reference)
A similar generalization appears to hold in the case of Condition B (Lasnik 1989):
(83) a. *We like me. 
b. We think that I will win.
a'. *They like him [* if they and him have overlapping reference]
b'. They think that he will win [no restriction]
In other words, it appears that a pronoun may not overlap in reference with an expression that c-
commands it locally. Reinhart & Reuland (1993) challenged this claim, arguing that examples such
as (83)a improve markedly when the predicate is turned from distributive to collective; for instance
they give We elected me as acceptable. But there is a confound. Independently of the issue of
collectivity, Condition B effects tend to be weaker (for reasons unknown) with first person pronouns,
so that I like me is for instance relatively acceptable. We may control for this factor by considering
cases of disjoint reference that involve second person clitics in French (as was earlier, binding-
theoretic violations are in general sharper with clitics). It is then relatively clear that these examples
are still deviant (the last example is the collective one, which is relatively degraded):
(84) a. *Tu vous aimes 
      you-sg you-pl like
b. *Vous t'aimez
     you-pl you-sg like
c. *Tu vous choisiras
      you-sg you-pl will-choose
d. *Vous te choisirez
33
       you-pl you-sg will-choose
e. *Vous t'élirez
      you-pl you-sg will-elect
I conclude that Chomsky's and Lasnik's generalization still holds. But at this point we cannot account
for it - in particular because we haven't said anything about the semantics of plural expressions.
We start by analyzing plural pronouns that are bound by several antecedents - a phenomenon
we henceforth call 'partial binding' (echoing the term 'partial control' in Landau 2000). The
mechanism we introduce is then used to provide an account of Disjoint Reference effects.
6.1 Split Antecedents and Partial Binding
q Third Person Plural Pronouns
Any theory must make provisions for cases in which a plural pronoun has several antecedents, as is
the case below (I have used a traditional indexing mechanism to indicate binding dependencies):
(85) a. [Talking about John] [Each of hisk colleagues]i is so difficult that at some point or other
theyi, k’ve had an argument.
b. [Every boy]i told [every girl]k that theyi,k should have lunch together
Obviously the examples could be complicated still further to show that ambiguities arise when
several antecedents are available (e.g. Every professor suggested to every boy that he should suggest
to every girl that they should have a serious conversation). In other words, any standard theory must
allow for a logical syntax in which pronouns are multiply indexed. We do so in the present
framework by allowing a plural pronoun to have an arbitrary number of indices of any kind (positive
or negative). We then refine our interpretation procedure by introducing into our semantics 'split
cells'. The idea is that the denotations of indices that appear on the same plural pronoun should
appear in different compartments of the same (split) cell. This will lead to sequences such as
jAˆmHˆo˘a, where as before separations between cells are indicated by ˆ, while separations between
compartments of the same cell are indicated by ˘. Except for the evaluation of atomic predicates,
compartments behave exactly like full-fledged cells - in particular, when a pronoun with index -i is
to retrieve the element of position -i in a sequence, the position in question is determined by counting
both cells and compartments. For instance in the sequence jAˆmHˆo˘a, a occupies position -1, o
occupies position -2, mH occupies position -3, and jA occupies position -4. For the evaluation of
predicates, however, the elements that are found in different compartments of the same cell are
merged. Thus smoke evaluated under the sequence jAˆmHˆo˘a will be deemed true just in case the
(mereological) sum of o and a, which we write  as o⊕a, lies in the extension of smoke (at the world
of evaluation).  In the following example we present a mixed case, in which the pronoun they-1,2 has
an anaphoric component, indicated by the negative index -2, and a demonstrative component, given
by the positive index 1 (which in this case denotes Ann). I further assume that the clause is
embedded, and that the last referential expression which was processed denoted Oscar:
(86) a. They1,-2  are happy  (where 1 denotes Ann)
a'. They1,-2  be-happy
b. [[a]] w jAˆmHˆo, ø
=[[they,-2 be-happy]] w jAˆmHˆoˆa, ø since D(1)=a
=[[are-happy]] w jAˆmHˆ#ˆa˘o, ø
=1 iff a⊕oŒIw(be-happy)
The same analysis can be extended to more complex cases, involving both quantification and
split antecedents. For instance the sentence [Every professor] t-1 thinks that they-1, 3 should-talk
involves a pronoun they-1, 3 which has a demonstrative component (hence the positive index 3) and
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which is also partly bound by the trace of a quantifier (this accounts for the index -1). In a nutshell,
the derivation proceeds as follows:
-First, the quantifier every professor is processed. It introduces the individual d in the
quantificational sequence of the nuclear scope for each d which is a professor. This leads to a pair of
sequences jAˆmH, d, where jAˆmH is the sequence of evaluation and d is the new quantificational
sequence.
-Second, the trace of the quantifier is processed. It introduces in the sequence of evaluation an index
1 which cross-references the first (and only) element of the quantificational sequence. This leads to a
new pair of sequences jAˆmHˆ1, d.
-Third, the embedded clause is evaluated - its value is necessary in order to evaluate the predicate
think.  The evaluation starts with the embedded pronoun they-1, 3.
(a) In the first step, the  index -1 is processed, with the effect that the last element of the sequence
jAˆmHˆ1 is replaced with # and moved to the end of the new sequence. This yields a new pair of
sequences jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1, d.
(b) In the second step, the second index of they-1, 3, namely 3, is taken care of. This has the effect of
adding to the last cell of the sequence jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1 a second compartment, which contains the
denotation of 3, which we take to be Oscar. The resulting pair of sequences is thus jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1˘o, d.
-Finally, the predicate should-talk is evaluated with respect to the pair of sequences AˆmHˆ#ˆ1˘o, d.
Since the index 1 found in the last cell of the sequence of evaluation cross-references the one and
only element of the quantificational sequence, d, the predicate is true under this pair of sequences
just in case the mereological sum of d and o lies in the interpretation of should-talk at the world of
evaluation.
This somewhat complex derivation is given in more detail below:
(87) a. Every professor thinks that they (=the professor and Oscar) should talk
a'. LF: [Every professor] t-1 thinks that they-1, 3 should-talk (where Ds(3)=o)
b. [[(a)]] w jAˆmH, ø=1 iff for each d such that [[professor]] w jAˆmH, d=1,
[[t-1 thinks that they-1, 3 should talk]] w jAˆmH, d=1
iff for each d such that dŒIw(professor), [[thinks that they-1, 3 should-talk]] w jAˆmHˆ1, d=1
iff for each d such that dŒIw(professor), [[thinks]] w jAˆmHˆ1ˆp, d =1
with p=lw' [[they-1, 3 should-talk]] w' jAˆmHˆ1, d
   =lw' [[they, 3 should-talk]] w' jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1, d 
   =lw' [[should-talk]] w' jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1˘o, d
   =lw' d⊕oŒIw'(should-talk)
iff for each d such that dŒIw(professor), dˆpŒIw(thinks)
q First and Second Person Plural Pronouns
This analysis can be extended to first and second person plural pronouns, at least when there is
exactly one speaker and exactly one hearer. First, plural indexical pronouns, just like third person
pronouns, can have split antecedents. The point was made in Partee (1989), who gave the following
example:
(88) John often comes over for Sunday brunch. Whenever someone else comes over too, we (all)
end up playing trios. (Otherwise we play duets). (Partee 1989)
Intuitively it is clear that we means something like: John, myself, and whoever else comes as well.
This example involves additional complexities, however - in particular the presence of a 'donkey'
component, since the existential quantifier someone else appears to partly bind we even though it
does not c-command it. Simpler examples can make the same point (again I adopt a standard
notation to indicate the intended reading):
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(89) a. [Each of myi colleagues]k is so difficult that at some point or other wei, k’ve had an argument.
b. [Each of youri new colleagues]k is so difficult that at some point or other youi, k'll end up
having an argument.
It would be easy to construct examples in which we or plural you are partly bound by several
quantifiers; in fact (88) is of precisely this kind. The generalization, then, is that just like third person
plural pronouns, we and plural you can have an arbitrary number of antecedents. As with other plural
pronouns, there should presumably be no presupposition that a singular individual is denoted, for
otherwise a singular pronoun would have been used (Note that we do not want the stronger
requirement that it be presupposed that several individuals are denoted; for one may felicitously say
in certain situations They are one and the same individual, or even You are one and the same
individual, where of course you is read as plural [French Vous êtes une seule et même personne]).
We submit that the only requirement for first, second and third person pronouns is as follows:
(90) The cell introduced by a pronoun pro must:
-contain the speaker if pro is first person
-contain the addressee but not the speaker if pro is second person
-contain neither the addressee nor the speaker if pro is third person
The results are unsurprising for simple examples: I-3 run will for instance be semantically acceptable
under a sequence jAˆmHˆo because the element in position -3 carries the diacritic A. The following
example is more intricate, since we has both an indexical and a demonstrative component:
(91) a. We-2,1 agree (where 1 denotes Ann)
a'. we-2,1 agree
b. [[a']] w jAˆmH, ø=[[we,1 agree]] w #ˆmHˆjA, ø
=[[agree]] w #ˆmHˆjA˘a, ø since 1 denotes Ann
=1 iff j⊕aŒIw(agree)
The constraint on first person pronouns is thus satisfied, since the cell introduced by the pronoun is
jA˘a, which does contain the speaker.
Let us turn to a more intricate example, [Each of you]i ti is so depressed that hei /*youi can't
sleep.   This sentence has proven difficult to handle for presuppositional analyses of second person
features (e.g. Schlenker 2003, to appear). The presuppositional analysis would go like this: a variable
with second person features carries a presupposition that it ranges over addressees - with fine results
when the variable in question is free, as in demonstrative uses of you (e.g. youi [pointing] are clever,
but youk [pointing again] aren't). But in the above sentence the theory makes incorrect predictions: as
it turns out, the bound pronoun he does range over addressees27, and according to the
presuppositional theory it should thus be pronounced as you, contrary to fact. This problem does not
arise in the present framework. The trace of each of you introduces in the sequence of evaluation a
formal object, say the index 1, which is distinct from any addressee  (although of course it does
cross-reference an addressee). The constraints on person features that we just stated entail that the
bound pronoun, which simply recovers the formal object 1, should be spelled out as third rather than
second person. This is a welcome result28.
The analysis is slightly more complex when we is partly bound by a quantifier. The key steps
are summarized in the following derivation:
(92) a. Every professor thinks that we should talk
a'. LF: [Every professor] [t-1 thinks that we-1, -4 should-talk]
b. Initial sequences: jAˆmH, ø
1st Step: [Every professor] is processed => jAˆmH, d, for various values of d
2nd step: t-1 is processed => jAˆmHˆ1, d
3rd step: the 1st index of we-1, -4 is processed => jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1, d
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4tH step: the 2nd index of we-1, -4 is processed => #ˆmHˆ#ˆ1˘jA, d
5tH step: should-talk is evaluated (with respect to the 1-resolution of #ˆmHˆ#ˆ1˘jA, d, i.e. d⊕j)
And a full derivation is included in (93) (again, I omit failure conditions):
(93) a. Every professor thinks that we should talk
a'. LF: [Every professor] t-1 think that we-1, -4 should-talk
b. [[(a)]] w jAˆmH, ø=1 iff for each d such that [[professor]] w jAˆmH, d=1,
[[t-1 thinks that we-1, -4 should-talk]] w jAˆmH, d=1
iff for each d such that dŒIw(professor), [[thinks that we-1, -4 should-talk]] w jAˆmHˆ1, d=1
iff for each d such that dŒIw(professor), [[thinks]] w jAˆmHˆ1ˆp, d=1
with p=lw' [[we-1, -4 should-talk]] w' jAˆmHˆ1, d
   =lw' [[we, -4 should-talk]] w' jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1, d
   =lw' [[should-talk]] w' #ˆmHˆ#ˆ1˘jA, d
   =lw' j⊕dŒIw(should-talk)
iff for d such that dŒIw(professor), dˆpŒIw(think)
6.2 Disjoint Reference
Presumably something like the mechanism introduced in 6.1 is needed in any theory. Unfortunately,
it is not quite enough to handle the disjoint reference data. Translating into our framework some of
the early generative analyses of disjoint reference effects (Lasnik 1989), we could posit that the only
way for an expression to denote a plurality is to bear one index for each of the objects of the group.
But this proposal is immediately absurd, as it entails that in the following discourse they bears
infinitely many indices:
(94) There are infinitely many even numbers. They are all multiples of 2.
There is no way to avoid the conclusion that a plural pronoun may bear an index that denotes a plural
object (see also Büring 2002b for a similar remark). But as soon as this mechanism is introduced, it
allows for representations such as They1 told John to leave, where the index 1 denotes, say, the group
that includes John and Mary (i.e. j⊕m). Although the sentence is intuitively ungrammatical, it is not
ruled out by Non-Redundancy as currently stated, since John is not identical to the group that
includes John and Mary (i.e., j⊕m≠j). If the theory is to stand, Non-Redundancy must be refined.
q Refining Non-Redundancy
In the singular case, Non-Redundancy required that no object appear twice in the same sequence of
evaluation. The heuristic motivation behind this principle was one of cognitive efficiency -  a
cognitive agent, we argued, would be better off not storing information about the same individual in
different cells of its memory. The argument can presumably be extended to situations that involve
plural objects. Suppose that on Occasion A Joe encountered a tall dark-haired man with a long knife,
and that on Occasion B Joe encountered two people angry at him, one tall and dark-haired, the other
tall and blond. Again it would be highly ineffective to create a new file for the group of people
encountered on Occasion B without first checking whether one member of the group hadn't already
been seen on Occasion A. This strategy suggests that no new file should be created if the (singular or
plural) object it refers to overlaps with another object already listed in an existing file. This leads to a
revised version of Non-Redundancy:
(95) Non-Redundancy (revised)
A given sequence of evaluation may not contain overlapping objects in different cells.
q Condition C
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Suppose first that they1 denotes a group that includes Oscar and Ann. Then the sentence They1 think
that Oscar is nice will be straightforwardly ruled out, because when Oscar is processed a violation of
the revised version of Non-Redundancy will occur:
(96) a. *They1 think that Oscar is nice, where 1 denotes o⊕a
b. (a) [evaluated under  jAˆmH, ø] is deviant because is-nice must be evaluated under a sequence
jAˆmHˆo⊕aˆo, ø, which violates the revised version of Non-Redundancy.
Note that it won't help to give several indices to they -say, 2 and 3, where 2 denotes Oscar and 3
denotes Ann. This will have the effect of introducing a split cell when the matrix subject is
processed, but Non-Redundancy (in fact, the 'old' version of it) will be violated when Oscar is added
to the sequence of evaluation:
(97) a. *They2, 3 think that John is nice, where 2 denotes Oscar and 3 denotes Ann
b. (a) [evaluated under  jAˆmH] is deviant because is-nice must be evaluated under a sequence
jAˆmHˆo˘aˆo, ø, which violates Non-Redundancy.
On the other hand multiple indexing will correctly allow a sentence such as Oscar thinks that they
(i.e. he and Ann) are nice:
(98) a. OkOscar thinks that they-1, 3 are nice, where 3 denotes Ann.
b. (a) [evaluated under  jAˆmH, ø] is predicted to be grammatical:
Step 1: Oscar is processed => jAˆmHˆo, ø
Step 2: the first index of they-1, 3 is processed => jAˆmHˆ#ˆo, ø
Step 3: the second index of they-1, 3 is processed => jAˆmHˆ#ˆo˘a, ø
Without multiple indexing, however, this sentence would have been ruled out. On the assumption
that they1 denotes Oscar and Ann, a violation of the revised version of Non-Redundancy would have
occurred when the embedded subject was processed -  are-nice would have been evaluated under a
sequence jAˆmHˆoˆo⊕a, ø which violates the revised version of Non-Redundancy.
We also correctly predict that They think that he is nice should be grammatical, even when they
and he overlap in reference. But given the system laid out at this point this is possible only because
multiple indexing is allowed on they:
(99) a. They2,3 think that he-2 is nice, where 2 denotes Oscar and 3 denotes Ann
b. (a) [evaluated under  jAˆmH, ø] is predicted to be grammatical:
Step 1: the first index of they2, 3 is processed  => jAˆmHˆo, ø
Step 2: the second index of they2, 3 is processed => jAˆmHˆo˘a, ø
Step 3: he-2 is processed => jAˆmHˆ#˘aˆo, ø
At this point we encounter a difficulty, however. So far we have allowed only pronouns to
carry several indices. Proper names don't carry indices at all, hence a fortiori they cannot carry
several indices. But this would seem to predict that Bill and Hillary think that she will become
president should end up being a violation of Non-Redundancy. For as soon as Bill and Hillary is
processed, its denotation, namely b⊕h, should be entered in the original sequence jAˆmH, yielding a
new sequence jAˆmHˆb⊕h. If she is used deictically, the revised version of Non-Redundancy will be
violated because the embedded VP is evaluated under a sequence jAˆmHˆb⊕hˆh, which violates the
revised version of Non-Redundancy. On the other hand if she carries a negative index, say -1, it can
only recover the entire object b⊕h, rather than h only, as is desired. Clearly we need to say that b and
h have been entered in different compartments of the same cell, yielding for instance a sequence
jAˆmHˆb˘h. When she-1 is evaluated under this sequence, it has the effect of bringing h to the end of a
new sequence, namely jAˆmHˆb˘#ˆh. This yields the correct result - the embedded VP is predicated of
Hillary rather than of the sum of Bill and Hillary. But it is as yet unclear why conjunctions of proper
names may introduce split cells in the sequence of evaluation. I leave this for future research.
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q Condition B
With this framework in place for Condition C, disjoint reference effects that arise with
respect to Condition B follow straightforwardly. As before, the effect is triggered when atomic
predicates are evaluated. We noted above that the sentence They2,3 think that he-2 is nice, with the
indexing as indicated, is correctly predicted to be grammatical. But it we consider a sentence in
which there is less  'distance' between the two pronouns, for instance They2,3 like him-2, the result is
correctly predicted to be uninterpretable. As before, the key is that the atomic predicate like has to be
evaluated under a sequence of evaluation that 'contains' # in one of its last two cells. The only new
element concerns the technical implementation of the notion of 'containment'. In our previous system
a given cell contained exactly one element. Now, by contrast, a cell may contain several
compartments; and of course it will be enough to trigger a failure that one of the compartments
involved in the evaluation of an atomic predicate contain #. This is illustrate in the following
derivation:
(100) a. They2,3 like him-2, where 2 denotes Oscar and 3 denotes Ann
b. [[a]] w jAˆmH, ø
=[[they,3 like him-2]] w jAˆmHˆo, ø (since 2 denotes Oscar)
=[[like him-2]] w jAˆmHˆo˘a, ø  (since 3 denotes Ann)
=[[like]] w jAˆmHˆ#˘aˆo, ø
=# since jAˆmHˆ#˘aˆo contains # in one of its last two cells.
In fact, the sequence history of this example is the same as that in (99). The only difference is that in
the latter the embedded predicate is-nice, which is intransitive, could without problem be evaluated
with respect to the sequence jAˆmHˆ#˘aˆo. Here, by contrast, like is transitive, and hence must have
access to the last two cells of jAˆmHˆ#˘aˆo. But the penultimnate cell, #˘a, contains #, which
presumably makes it impossible to form the sum of # and a, let alone to evaluate whether that sume
stands in the like relation to o. This explains why the sentence is deviant.
To conclude, I hope to have suggested that a semantic analysis of binding-theoretic effects
based on Non-Redundancy has at least some initial plausibility. Needless to say, there are many open
questions; here are the most pressing:
(i) It is unclear at this point how Condition B should be analyzed when it involves ECM
constructions. A possible solution is sketched in Appendix I.
(ii) Condition B appears to apply to possessives in some languages, e.g. Russian. Our analysis, based
on coarguments of a given atomic predicate, seems to be ill-suited to deal with these data, which may
in the end refute the present attempt.
(iii) We have not given any account of Condition A. Some preliminary remarks can be found in
Appendix II.
(iv) We have not explained the difference in status between John likes John (deviant but not
horrible) and He likes John, understood with coreference (impossible). Nor have we accounted for
the fact - noted by Lasnik (1989) - that some languages allow an R-expression to be c-commanded
by a coreferential R-expression, while no language allows an R-expression to be c-commanded by a
coreferential pronoun. In fact, we have not given any account of cross-linguistic variation with
respect to binding constraints.
Other questions should be further investigated, for instance the analysis of ellipsis (which has only
been touched upon), or the semantic role played by intermediate traces in case of successive cyclic
wh-movement. I leave all of these questions for future research. On the other hand a significant part
of the theory has been implemented in Appendix III, which gives an account of Condition C,
Condition B, Quantification and Weak and Strong Crossover (though the rules do not handle partial
binding or disjoint reference effects).
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Appendix I. Condition B Revisited
Our version of Condition B  runs into problems with the following examples:
(101) a. *Johni believes [himi to be smart].
a'. Johni believes [himselfi to be smart].
b. *Johni wants [himi to be elected].
b'. Johni wants [himselfi to be elected]
c. *Johni seems to himi to be smart.
c'. Johni seems to himselfi to be smart.
In all cases the difficulty is that standard syntactic analyses (esp. in the Government & Binding
tradition) postulate that him is not an argument of the matrix verb (believes, wants, seems), but rather
that it belongs to the embedded clause, as is suggested by the bracketing. This certainly makes
semantic sense, since it would seem that _ believe_,  _want_ or seem to_  _ establish a relation
between an individual (the attitude holder) and a proposition. This intuition is further strengthened
by the observation that some quantifiers may (more or less easily) take scope under the attitude verb;
on standard accounts this suggests that the semantic value of the object found under the verb is
indeed a proposition, which entails that (102)a and b can have the Logical Forms in (102)a' and b'
respectively (the latter is presumably obtained from (102)b by reconstructing the quantifier into its
base position):
(102) a. Sam believes at least one person to be smart
a'. Sam believes [[at least one person]i ti to be smart]
b. At least one person seems to Sam to be smart
b'. seems to Sam [at least one person]i [ti to be smart]
On the other hand, these constructions also allow quantifiers such as nobody to take scope over the
intensional verb. Thus (102)a and b have possible Logical Forms such as those in (103)a' and b'
respectively. By contrast, the constructions involving that-clauses in (103)c-d do not have an
analogous reading - the quantifier remains trapped in the that-clause:
(103) a. Sam believes no one (in particular) to be smart
a'. [no one]i Sam ti believes [ti to be smart]
b. No one (in particular) seems to Sam to be smart
b'. [no one (in particular)]i seems to Sam [ti to be smart]
c. Sam believes that no one (in particular) is smart
cannot mean: There is no one (in particular) that Sam believes is smart
d. It seems to Sam that no one (in particular) is smart
cannot mean: There is no one (in particular) that seems to Sam to be smart.
These observations can be derived from the following assumptions:
A1. In the derivational history of (102)a-b and (103)a-b, the embedded subject raises at some point
out of the embedded clause to a position which we will call the 'high' position. For seem the process
is overt, since the semantic subject of the embedded clause is pronounced in the matrix clause. For
believe the process may or may not be overt, depending on whether Postal's 'raising to object'
analysis is correct (see Postal (2003) for a recent discussion). In any event it is standardly assumed
that the embedded subject may at some point reach a position in the matrix clause, maybe Chomsky's
'AgrO' position, from which it may move higher to adjoin to the matrix IP if it is a quantifier. This
accounts for the data in (103).
A2.  After it has moved to the 'high' position, the embedded subject may still reconstruct to a low
position. Only this hypothesis can account for the data in (102) (if there were on reconstruction there
would be no ambiguity).
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This cannot be the end of the story, however. For unless the assumptions A1 and A2 are further
constrained, we are bound to make incorrect predictions for (104)a:
(104) a. *Hei seems to [Sami's mother] to be clever
b. seems to [Sami's mother]  hei to be clever
c. hei seems to [Sami's mother]  ti to be clever
If, following A2,  reconstruction is always possible, the Logical Form in (104)b should be available,
and thus (104)a should have a reading that does not violate Condition C, contrary to fact. What is
needed is a condition such as A3, for which Fox (2000) provides independent evidence:
A3. Reconstruction is possible only if affects the truth conditions.
Fox (2000) argues that, quite generally, Quantifier Raising and Quantifier Lowering are licensed
only if they have an effect on the truth conditions29. Since he is a rigid designator, reconstructing it to
its base position as in (104)b would not lead to different truth conditions from (104)c, and as a result
(104)b is blocked. (104)c, on the other hand, is ruled out by Condition C.
How can this analysis be incorporated to our account of Condition B? There are at least three
solutions, all of them imperfect. For ease of exposition I discuss the case of believe (the following
remarks carry over to seem).
B1. We may assume 'believe' is ambiguous: 'standard' believe takes two arguments, an individual and
a proposition, while its variant believe* takes three arguments, two individuals and a property.
Furthermore believe* is related to believe by the following rule:
(105) For all individuals a, b , for each property pi, and for each possible word s',
aˆbˆpiŒIw(believes*) iff aˆpi(b)ŒIw(believes)
We need to further assume that the appearance of the star on believe*  is triggered by the presence of
an argument in the 'high' position (without this stipulation believe and believe* would appear in
syntactic derivations that could not be compared by Fox's economy condition); and that unless there
is reconstruction the semantic value of the embedded clause is a property, i.e. a member of ({0,
1}W)X, where W is the set of possible worlds and X the set of individuals. With these assumptions,
(101)a receives the following analysis:
(106) a. #Sam believes him to be smart (with coreference)
a'. Sam him-1 believes* to be smart (reconstruction of him-1 to the lower position is prohibited
by Fox's economy condition; the appearance of * on believe is triggered by the presence of an
argument in the 'high' position)
b. [[a]] w jAˆmH, ø=[[ him-1 believes to be smart]] w jAˆmHˆs, ø=[[believes* to be smart]] jAˆmHˆ#ˆs, ø
=[[believes*]] jAˆmHˆ#ˆsˆpi, ø,with pi=[[ to be smart]] jAˆmHˆ#ˆs, ø (which we assume is a property)
=# since believe* is a 3-place predicate and one of the last three elements of jAˆmHˆ#ˆsˆpi is #.
B2. A slightly different alternative is to posit that believe is not lexically ambiguous, and to stipulate
that it receives the following interpretation:
(107)  [[believe]] ws, q=# iff (s violates Non-Redundancy) or (s-1 [i.e. the last element of s] is neither a
proposition nor a property) or    (s-1 is a proposition and s-2=#) or (s-1 is a property and (s-2=# or
s-3=#)).
Otherwise, [[believe]] ws, q=1 iff s-1 is a proposition and <s-2, s-1>ŒIw(believe) or s-1 is a property
and < s-3, s-1(s-2), >ŒIw(believe)
The advantage of this solution is that we do not have to stipulate that the appearance of * is triggered
by the presence of an argument in the higher position. But this comes with a cost - we must stipulate
that believe has a non-standard semantics (other verbs look at a fixed number of elements of the
sequence of evaluation, while believe considers the last two or the last three elements, depending on
the nature of the last element).   The derivation of (106) can be preserved as it is, except that the *
does not appear on believe.
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B3. A third alternative is to assume that 'believe' is lexically ambiguous, but that the third argument
of believe* is a proposition rather than a property. The rule relating believe* to believe is then much
more trivial:
(108) For all individuals a, b, for each proposition p, and for each world w,
aˆbˆpŒIw(believes*) iff aˆp(b)ŒIw(believes)
In order to ensure that the embedded clause is always interpreted as a proposition (even when there is
no reconstruction), we may either stipulate that the trace left by A-movement behaves like a pronoun
(rather than as a l-abstractor, as must be assumed in B1 and B2), or alternatively that the trace is not
interpreted at all - as long as no other referential element intervenes between the 'high' position and
the VP the latter will be predicated of the moved element, as is desired.    The derivation in (106) is
then modified to become (109):
(109) a. #Sam believes him to be smart (with coreference)
a'. Sam him-1 believes* (pro-1) to be smart (reconstruction of him-1 to the lower position is
prohibited by Fox's economy condition; the appearance of * on believe is triggered bby the
presence of an argument in the high position; and the trace left behind by him-1 behaves like a
pronoun, or alternatively is not interpreted at all)
b. [[a]] w jAˆmH, ø=[[ him-1 believes pro-1 to be-smart]] w jAˆmHˆs, ø
=[[believes* pro-1 to be smart]] wjAˆmHˆ#ˆs, ø=[[believes*]] wjAˆmHˆ#ˆsˆp, ø
 with p=[[pro-1 to be-smart]] wjAˆmHˆ#ˆs, ø =lw' sŒIw'(be-smart)
=# since believe* is a 3-place predicate and one of the last three elements of jAˆmHˆ#ˆsˆp is #.
Needless to say, more work is needed to determine whether B1, B2 or B3 can be made theoretically
and empirically adequate.
Appendix II. Condition A
How should Condition A be handled in the present framework? Clearly it won't do to analyze
reflexives as garden-variety pronouns. Consider for instance John likes himself. If himself carries a
positive index, likes will have to be evaluated under a sequence that violates Non-Redundancy, and a
semantic failure will follow. If himself carries the index -1, likes will be evaluated with respect to a
sequence that ends in #ˆj, and again the result will be a semantic failure. A more promising
suggestion is to treat reflexives as arity reducers, i.e. as operators that turn an (n+1)-place predicate
into an n-place predicate. However there are two problems with this approach.
(i) First, in complex cases a reflexive may have two local antecedents, as in the following example:
(110) a. Ok Johni introduced Billk to himselfi
b. Ok Johni introduced Billk to himselfk
In such cases one can't just say that the verb has been reflexivized. One must also specify which
position has been reflexivized.
 (ii) Second, and more importantly, the analysis of reflexives as arity reducers only takes care of half
of the problem. To see this, consider the following pair:
(111) a. Peteri believes Ann to like himi
b. *?Peteri believes Ann to like himselfi
c. Peteri believes himselfi to like Ann
d. *Peteri believes himselfi to like himi
e. Peteri believes himselfi to like himselfi
Reflexivizing the 3-place version of believe explains why (111)c is grammatical, but not why (111)d
isn't. The latter fact can be accounted for only if the reflexive has the effect of making its antecedent
unavailable for further anaphoric uptake (note that this is something that other pronouns
42
systematically do in the present system). But by the foregoing considerations it also won't do to state
that a reflexive simply behaves like an anaphoric pronoun, as this would immediately lead to
uninterpretability (by the same reasoning that derived Condition B).
The most natural suggestion is that a reflexive such as himself is made of two parts:
-him behaves like an anaphoric pronoun (and thus makes its antecedent unavailable for further
anaphoric uptake)
-self is an arity-reducing operator that applies (in the Lexicon) to an (n+1)-place predicate to yield an
n-place predicate.
One difficult question is how the -self part can indicate which position is being reflexivized. If the
problem can be solved we will obtain derivations such as the following, where -self1, 3 is taken to
apply to a 3-place predicate P and to turn it into a 2-place predicate lxlyP(x, y, x).
(112) a. Peter introduced Ann to himself.
a'. Peter Ann him-2     self1,3-introduce
b. [[a']] w jAˆmH=[[ Ann him-2    self1,3-introduce]] w jAˆmHˆp=[[him-2    self1,3-introduce]] w jAˆmHˆpˆa
=[[ self1,3-introduce]] w jAˆmHˆ#ˆaˆp
=1 iff aˆpŒIw(self1,3-introduce)
iff aˆpˆaŒIw(introduce)
Needless to say, the tenability of this approach to Condition A is as yet unclear.
Appendix III. Semantic Binding Theory: Rules and Derivations
q Syntax
We omit the syntax for the sake of brevity. Any set of rules that yield the Logical Forms we give
below will do. The only difficulty is to insure that traces of quantifiers get the correct index, i.e. that
they bear a negative index that corresponds to the LF position of the quantifier that is supposed to
bind them. How this is best achieved is left open here. (We could have adopted a more conservative
treatment of quantifiers and traces, in which (a) a quantifier Qi manipulates i-variants of the
quantificational sequence, and (b) a trace ti introduces the index i in the sequence of evaluation. This
would have gotten rid of the syntactic difficulty we just noted, but it would also have made our
treatment of determiners and nouns more complicated, since we could not have relied on the fact that
a determiner systematically introduces an element at the end of the sequence of evaluation.
Obviously alternative options should be explored in future work).
q Semantics
• Models
A model for our Semantic Binding Theory is a quadruple <X, W, I, D>
where
-X is a set of individuals
-W is a set of possible worlds (disjoint from X)
-I is an interpretation function, which for each world w of W assigns:
(i) to each proper name PN an element Iw(PN) of X.
We further stipulate that for each proper name PN, for all w, w' of W, Iw(PN)=Iw'(PN)
(ii) to each element i-place verb or noun p,  a subset Iw(p) of Xi
(iii) to each attitude verb a, a subset Iw(a) of X ¥{0, 1}W (note that {0, 1}W  is the set of total
functions W to {0, 1})
-For each positive integer i, D assigns to i an element D(i) of X.
• Sequences of evaluation
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A sequence of evaluation is a sequence of objects of X»(X¥{A, H})»|N»{#}, where A and H are
two roles (author and hearer, respectively) and # is the undefined object (we take X¥{A, H} to be a
set of 2-membered sequences). We further stipulate that any sequence of evaluation contains exactly
one member which is itself a sequence of the form  xˆA and exactly one sequence of the form x'ˆH,
for x, x' in X.
Auxiliary conventions:
- If d is an element of X, we write dA for dˆA and dH for dˆH
-We identify throughout a 1-membered sequence with its only element.
-If s and s' are two sequences, sˆs' is their concatenation
-If s is a sequence, |s| is the length of s.
-If s is sequence, i(d) denotes its ith coordinate if it has one, and * otherwise.
-If s is a sequence that has at least n elements, s-n is the element found in the nth position, counting
from the end of the sequence.
-If s is a sequence of evaluation and q is a quantificational sequence, we define the sequence of the
last n individuals of s given q, written sn(q). sn(q) is defined so as not to include any roles:
If n>|s|, sn=*
If n≤|s|: (dmˆ ...ˆdnˆ ...ˆd1)n(q)= dn(q)ˆ  ...ˆd1(q)
where for each iŒ[[1, n]]
di(q)=1(di) if diœ|N
di(q)=i(q) if diŒ|N
Adequacy: We say that d is adequate for a pronoun pro if
pro=I and 2(d)=A
pro=you and 2(d)=H
pro=he, she and 2(d)œ{A, H}
Non-Redundancy: A sequence of evaluation s satisfies Non-Redundancy iff for all positive integers
m, n,
((m≤|s| & n≤|s|) fi (1(s-m)≠1(s-n) v 1(s-m)=#).
• Satisfaction and Denotation
—If proi is a pronoun with a positive index (pro≠I, you), [[proi]] w s, q=D(i).
—If PN is a proper name, [[PN]] w s, q=Iw(PN)
—  [[  [the n] ]] w s, q=# iff there is 0 or strictly more than 1 element x of X satisfying [[n]] w s, qˆx=1.
Otherwise, [[ [the n]]] w s, q=x for x satisfying [[ n]] w s, qˆx=1.
—If N is a noun taking n arguments, [[N]] ws, q=# iff s violates Non-Redundancy or |q|=0 or q-1ˆ(sn-
1(q))œXn. Otherwise, [[N]] w s, q=1 iff q-1ˆ(sn-1(q))ŒIw(N)
—If V is a verb taking n arguments, other than an attitude verb, [[V]] ws, q=# iff s violates Non-
Redundancy or sn(q) œXn. Otherwise, [[N]] w s, q=1 iff sn(q)ŒIw(V)
—If A is an attitude verb, [[A]] w s, q=# iff s violates Non-Redundancy or s2(q)œ X¥{0, 1}W.
Otherwise, [[A]] w s, q=1 iff s2(q)ŒIw(A)
—If pro-i is a pronoun with a negative index -i, for any expression e,
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[[ [pro-i e]]] w s, q=[[ [e pro-i]]] w s, q=# iff |s|<i or s-i is not adequate for pro. Otherwise, if
s=dm...ˆdi+1ˆdiˆdi-1ˆ ...ˆd1, [[ [pro-i e]]] w s, q=[[  [e pro-i]]] w s, q=[[e]] w dmˆ ...ˆdi+1ˆ#ˆdi-1ˆ ...ˆd1ˆdi, q
—If n is an R-expression (i.e. a definite description, a proper name, or a pronoun with a positive
index), [[  [n e] ]] w s, q=[[ [e n]]] w s, q=[[e]] w sˆ[[n]] ws, q
— [[  [that p] ]] w s, q=# iff for some w' in W, [[p]] w s, q=#. Otherwise, [[ [that p] ]] w s, q=lw': w'ŒW.
[[p]]w' s, q
Treatment of Quantification
— [[  [ [every n] e] ]] w s, q=# iff (i) for some x in X, [[n]] w s, qˆx=#, or (ii) for some x in X satisfying
[[n]] w s, qˆx=1, [[e]] w s, qˆx=#. Otherwise, [[  [ [every n] e] ]] w s, q=1 iff for each x in X satisfying [[n]] w
s, qˆx=1, [[e]] w s, qˆx=1.
— [[ [t-i b] ]] ws, q= [[ [b t-i] ]] ws, q= [[b]] wsˆ(|q|+1-i), q
Examples
In the following examples, I assume that the speaker is John and that the addressee is Mary. The first
letter of an individual's proper name is used in the meta-language to refer to that individual. When
only one sequence appears, it is the sequence of evaluation, and the quantificational sequence is
taken to be empty (when we need to refer to the empty sequence, we write it as ø). In each example
a. is the English sentence whose simplified Logical Form is given in a'. b. provides a derivation of
truth- and failure-conditions.
A. Examples Without Quantifiers
(i) a. Ann smokes (is unproblematic)
a'. [Ann smoke]
b. [[a']] w jAˆmH=[[smoke]] w jAˆmHˆa. Hence
[[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff (jAˆmHˆa)1ŒIw(smoke), iff aŒIw(smoke)
Otherwise, [[a']] w jAˆmH=0.
(ii) a. I smoke (is correctly interpreted if I bears the 'right' index)
a'. [I-2 smoke]
b. [[ [I-2 smoke]]] w jAˆmH=# iff 2((jAˆmH)-2)≠A. But (jAˆmH)-2=jA and 2(jA)=A, hence this case
does not arise. Thus
[[a']] w jAˆmH=[[smoke]] w #ˆmHˆjA and
[[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff (#ˆmHˆjA)-1 ŒIw(smoke), iff jŒIw(smoke)
Otherwise, [[a']] w jAˆmH=0
Note: (i) [vI1 smoke] is not generated by the syntax (first and second person pronouns are assumed
to always be indexical and never demonstrative; this is obviously incorrect for second person
pronouns).
(ii) A failure would have resulted if the index of I had been -1 instead of -2:
(iii) a. I smoke (yields a failure if I bears the 'wrong' index)
a'. [I-1 smoke]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# because 2((jAˆmH)-1)=2(mH)=H and H≠A.
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(iv) a. #John smokes  (yields a failure because it is said by John)
a'. [John smoke]
b. [[ [John smoke]]] w jAˆmH=[[ smoke]] w jAˆmHˆj=# because jAˆmHˆj violates Non
Redundancy.
(v) a. #Mary smokes (yields a failure because it is said to Mary)
a'. [Mary smoke]
b. [[ [Mary smoke]]] w jAˆmH= [[ smoke]] w jAˆmHˆm=# since jAˆmHˆm violates Non-
Redundancy.
(vi) a. Ann hates Bill (is unproblematic)
a'. [Ann [hates Bill]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH= [[ [hates Bill]]] w jAˆmHˆa= [[ hates ]] w jAˆmHˆaˆb. Hence
[[ a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff (jAˆmHˆaˆb)2 ŒIw(hate), iff aˆbŒIw(hate),
Otherwise, [[ a']] w jAˆmH=0
(vii) a. #Ann hates Ann (violates Non-Redundancy)
a'. [Ann [hate Ann]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH= [[ [hate Ann]]] w jAˆmHˆa= [[ hate]] w jAˆmHˆaˆa=# since jAˆmHˆaˆa violates Non
Redundancy
(viii) a. #She hates Ann (violates Non-Redundancy if interpreted with coreference)
a'. [she1 [hate Ann]], assuming that D(1)=a
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH= [[ [hate Ann]]] w jAˆmHˆa since D(1)=a
= [[hate]] w jAˆmHˆaˆa=# since jAˆmHˆaˆa violates Non Redundancy
(ix) a. Ann's teacher hates Ann (never violates Non-Redundancy)
a'. [[the [Ann teacher]] [hate Ann]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH= [[ [hate Ann]]] w jAˆmHˆt with t=[[ [the [Ann teacher]]]] w jAˆmH.
 
Side computation
t=# iff there is 0 or more than 1 element x in X satisfying
[[ [Ann teacher]]] w jAˆmH, x=[[ teacher]] w jAˆmHˆa, x=1, iff there is 0 or more than 1 element
x in X satisfying xˆaŒIw(teacher).  Otherwise, t=x, where x satisfies
xˆaŒIw(teacher).
Hence:
If there is 0 or more than 1 element x in X satisfying xˆaŒIw(teacher),
[[ a']] w jAˆmH= [[ [hate Ann]]] w jAˆmHˆ#= [[ hate]] w jAˆmHˆ#ˆa=# since (jAˆmHˆ#ˆa)2(ø)=#ˆa,
which contains #. Otherwise, for x satisfying tˆaŒIw(teacher),  [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [hate Ann]]] w
jAˆmHˆx= [[ hate]] w jAˆmHˆxˆa=1 iff xˆaŒIw(hate).
(x) a. Ann's teacher hates her (never violates Non-Redundancy)
a'. [[the [Ann teacher]] [hate her1], with the assumption that D(1)=a
b. Same as the preceding example
(xi) a. #Ann hates her (is uninterpretable if intended with coreference)
a'. [vAnn [hate her-1]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [hate her-1]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ hate]] w jAˆmHˆ#ˆa=# since (jAˆmHˆ#ˆa)2=#ˆaœX2.
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Note: If her had been given a positive index, e.g. 1 with the assumption that D(1)=a, a violation of
Non Redundancy would have resulted.
(xii) a. #Ann hates Ann's teacher (violates Non-Redundancy)
a'. [Ann [hate [the [Ann teacher]]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [hate [the [Ann teacher]]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ hate]] w jAˆmHˆaˆt
with t=[[ [the [Ann teacher]]]] w jAˆmHˆa
Side computation t=# iff there is 0 or more than 1 element x in X satisfying [[ [Ann
teacher]]] w jAˆmHˆa, x=1. But for every x in X [[ [Ann teacher]]] w jAˆmHˆa, x=[[ teacher]] w
jAˆmHˆaˆa, x=# since jAˆmHˆaˆ a violates Non-Redundancy. Hence there is 0 element x in X
satisfying [[ [Ann teacher]]] w jAˆmHˆa, x=1, and t=#.
Thus [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ hate]] w jAˆmHˆaˆ#=# since (jAˆmHˆaˆ#)2=aˆ#œX2
(xiii) a. Ann hates her teacher (does not violate Non-Redundancy)
a'. [Ann [hate [the [she-1 teacher]]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [hate [the [she-1 teacher]]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ hate]] w jAˆmHˆaˆt
with t=[[ [the [she-1 teacher]]]] w jAˆmHˆa
Side computation t=# iff there is 0 or more than 1 element x in X satisfying [[ [she-1
teacher]]] w jAˆmHˆa, x=1, iff there is 0 or more than 1 element x in X satisfying [[teacher]] w
jAˆmHˆ#ˆa, x=1, iff there is 0 or more than 1 element x in X such that xˆaŒIw(teacher).
Otherwise, t=x, where x satisfies xˆaŒIw(teacher)
Thus [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff (a) there is 0 or more than 1 element x in X satisfying
xˆaŒIw(teacher), or else (b) there is exactly one element x in X satisfying xˆaŒIw(teacher),
and Non-Redundancy is violated in jAˆmHˆaˆx, i.e. xŒ{j, m, a}.  Otherwise, [[a']] w jAˆmH=1
iff aˆxŒIw(hate), where x satisfies xˆaŒIw(teacher)
(xiv) a. Ann introduced Berenice to Cassandra (can be interpreted provided a Larsonian LF is
posited)
a'. [Ann [Berenice [introduce Cassandra]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [Berenice [introduce Cassandra]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ [introduce Cassandra]]] w
jAˆmHˆaˆb=[[ introduce]] w jAˆmHˆaˆbˆc. Hence [[ a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff aˆbˆcŒIw(introduce).
Otherwise, [[ a']] w jAˆmH=0
(xv) a. #Ann introduced Berenice to her, where her and Ann corefer (is uninterpretable)
a'. [Ann [Berenice [introduce her-2]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [Berenice [introduce her-2]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ [introduce her-2]]] w jAˆmHˆaˆb=[[
introduce]] w jAˆmHˆ#ˆbˆa=# since #ˆbˆaœX3
Note: If her carried a positive index that denoted Ann, the sentence would still end up being
uinterpretable because Non-Redundancy would be violated.
(xvi) a. #Ann introduced Berenice to her, where her and Berenice corefer (is uninterpretable)
a'. [Ann [Berenice [introduce her-1]]]
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b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [Berenice [introduce her-1]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ [introduce her-1]]] w jAˆmHˆaˆb=[[
introduce]] w jAˆmHˆaˆ#ˆb=# since aˆ#ˆbœX3
Note: If her carried a positive index that denoted Berenice, the sentence would still end up being
uinterpretable because Non-Redundancy would be violated.
(xvii) a. Ann claims that Bill smokes   (is easily interpreted)
a'. [Ann [claim [that [Bill smoke]]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [claim [that [Bill smoke]]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ claim]] w jAˆmHˆaˆp
with p= [[  [that [Bill smoke]] ]] w jAˆmHˆa=lw': w'ŒW. [[ [Bill smoke] ]] w'jAˆmHˆa=lw':
w'ŒW. [[smoke]] w'jAˆmHˆaˆb=lw': w'ŒW. b smokes in w'
(with the standard convention that b smokes in w' is used in the metalanguage to denote 1
if b smokes in w' and 0 otherwise).
Hence [[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff aˆpŒIw(claim). Otherwise [[a']] w jAˆmH=0.
(xviii) Ann claims that she smokes, with coreference (is easily interpreted)
a'. [Ann [claim [that [she-1 smoke]]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [claim [that [she-1 smoke]]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ claim]] w jAˆmHˆaˆp
with p= [[  [that [she-1 smoke]] ]] w jAˆmHˆa=lw': w'ŒW. [[ [she-1 smoke] ]] w'jAˆmHˆa=lw':
w'ŒW. [[smoke]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆa=lw': w'ŒW. a smokes in w'
Hence [[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff aˆpŒIw(claim). Otherwise [[a']] w jAˆmH=0.
(xix) a. I claim that I smoke (is easily interpreted if both occurrences of  I carry the 'right'
index)
a'. [I-2 [claim [that [I-1 smoke]]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [claim [that [I-1 smoke]]]]] w #ˆmHˆjA=[[ claim]] w #ˆmHˆjAˆp
with p= [[  [that [I-1 smoke]] ]] w #ˆmHˆj=lw': w'ŒW. [[ [I-1 smoke] ]] w#ˆmHˆjA=lw': w'ŒW.
[[smoke]] w'#ˆmHˆ#ˆjA=lw': w'ŒW. j smokes in w'
Hence [[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff aˆpŒIw(claim). Otherwise [[a']] w jAˆmH=0.
(xx) a. #Ann claims that she hates her, where her is anaphoric on she (is uninterpretable)
a'. [Ann [claim [that [she-1 [hate her-1]]]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ [claim [that [she-1 [hate her-1]]]]]] w jAˆmHˆa=[[ claim]] w jAˆmHˆaˆp
with p= [[  [that [she-1 [hate her-1]] ]] w jAˆmHˆa=lw': w'ŒW. [[[she-1 [hate her-1]] ]] w
jAˆmHˆa=lw': w'ŒW. [[ [hate her-1]]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆa=lw': w'ŒW. [[ hate]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆ#ˆa=lw':
w'ŒW. #, since (jAˆmHˆ#ˆ#ˆa)2=#ˆaœX2. As a result, p=lw': w'ŒW. # is not in {0, 1}W, and
by the rule of interpretation of attitude verbs [[ a']] w jAˆmH=#.
Note:  (i) If her carried a positive index that denoted Ann, the sentence would still end up being
uinterpretable because Non-Redundancy would be violated.
(ii) It won't help to link her to Ann rather than to she:
(xxi) a. #Ann claims that she hates her, where her is anaphoric on Ann (is uninterpretable)
a'. [Ann [claim [that [she-1 [hate her-2]]]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=[[ claim]] w jAˆmHˆaˆp (as in (xx))
with p=lw': w'ŒW. [[ [hate her-2]]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆa (as in (xx))
=lw': w'ŒW. [[ hate]] w'jAˆmHˆ#ˆaˆ#=lw': w'ŒW. #, since (jAˆmHˆ#ˆaˆ#)2=aˆ#œX2. As in
(xx), we obtain the result that [[ a']] w jAˆmH=#.
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B. Examples With Quantifiers
(xxii) a. Every man is mortal.
a'. [Every man [t-1 is-mortal]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff (i) for some x in X, [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=#, or (ii) for some x in X
satisfying [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=1, [[ [t-1 is-mortal]]] w jAˆmH, x=#.  This case never arises.
[[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff for each x in X satisfying [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=1, [[[t-1 is-mortal]]] w jAˆmH,
x=1,
iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[is-mortal]] w jAˆmHˆ(1+1-1), x=1,
iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), (jAˆmHˆ1)1(x)ŒIw(is-mortal)=1,
iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), xŒIw(is-mortal)=1
(xxiii) a. Every man respects his mother
a'. [[every man][t-1 [respect [the [he-1 mother]]]]]
b. It can be shown that [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff
(i) for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man),
there is 0 or more than 1 x' in X satisfying xˆx'ŒIw(mother), or
(ii) for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), thise exactly 1 x' in X satisfying
xˆx'ŒIw(mother), and that x' is j or m [for in that case Non-Redundancy gets violated when
we evalulated  [[ respect]] w jAˆmHˆ1ˆt,  x; this problem is discussed in the Note below.]
Otherwise, [[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff for each x in X satisfying [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=1, [[ [t-1[respect
[the [he-1 mother]]]]]] w jAˆmH, x=1,
iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[ [respect [the [he-1 mother]]] ]] w jAˆmHˆ1,  x=1,
iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[ respect]] w jAˆmHˆ1ˆt,  x=1, with
t=[[  [the [he-1 mother]] ]] w jAˆmHˆ1,  x
Side computation
Since for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), there is exactly one x' in X satisfying
xˆx'ŒIw(mother),
t=x', where x' satisfies [[[he-1 mother] ]] w jAˆmHˆ1,  xˆx'=1, i.e. [[ mother ]] w jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1,  xˆx',
i.e. x'ˆxŒIw(mother).
Thus [[a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), xˆx'ŒIw(respect), where x'
satisfies x'ˆxŒIw(mother)
Note: A violation of Non-Redundancy is predicted if one of the men's mother is the speaker or the
addressee. This prediction is probably incorrect. However as soon as the system is implemented
using implicit descriptions (i.e. functions from pairs of the form <context, quantificational sequence>
to individuals) rather than individuals, this problem disappears. This is because in [[ respect]] w
jAˆmHˆ1ˆt,  x, t will now be a function assigning to each pair <context, quantificational sequence> the
1st element of the quantificational sequence. Clearly such a function will be different from the
implicit description corresponding to the speaker or hearer, and hence Non-Redundancy will be
satisfied.
(xxiv) a. His mother respects every man (yields a Weak Crossover violation if his is bound by
every man)
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a'. [[every man][ [the [he-1 mother]] [respect t-1]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff for some x in X satisfying [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=1, [[[ [the [he-1 mother]]
[respect t-1]]  ]] w jAˆmH, x=#,
iff for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[[ [respect t-1]  ]] w jAˆmHˆt, x=#, with
t=[[ [the [he-1 mother]] ]] w jAˆmH, x,
iff for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[ respect ]] w jAˆmHˆtˆ1, x=#
Side computation
[[ [the [he-1 mother]] ]] w jAˆmH, x=# iff there is 0 or more than 1 x' in X satisfying [[  [he-1
mother]]] w jAˆmH, xˆx'=1. But (jAˆmH)-1 is not adequate for he-1, since (jAˆmH)-1= mH and
2(mH)=H. Hence for each x' in X [[  [he-1 mother]]] w jAˆmH, xˆx'=#, and thus there is 0 x' in
X satisfying [[  [he-1 mother]]] w jAˆmH, xˆx'=1. Therefore it is always the case that t=[[ [the
[he-1 mother]] ]] w jAˆmH, x=#.
Thus it is the case that  for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[ respect ]] w jAˆmHˆtˆ1, x=#,
since for all x in X [[ respect ]] w jAˆmHˆtˆ1, x=[[ respect ]] w jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1, x=# because
(jAˆmHˆ#ˆ1)2(x)=#ˆxœX2. Hence [[ a']] w jAˆmH=#.
Note 1:We obtain a semantic failure because, for various values of x, the quantifier introduces x in
the quantificational sequence rather than in the sequence of evaluation. As a result, the pronoun he-1
must recover mH, which is the last element of the sequence of evaluation. Since a 3rd person pronoun
cannot access an object with the H diacritic, a failure occurs when [he-1 mother] is interpreted. Note
that even if this problem did not arise (because the last element of the sequence of evaluation did not
contain an object with a diacritic), we would still not obtain a reading where he-1  covaries with the
quantifier. (In fact it would not help to change the index -1 to any other index either; as long as a
trace has not been processed, no pronoun may access an element of the quantificational sequence).
Note 2: In the following example we consider what happens if the pronoun he-1 is replaced with a
trace t-2 (the index has to be -2 rather than -1  because the determiner the introduces an element in the
quantificational sequence). This is a kind of 'repair strategy'. The fact that it leads to an interpretable
result explains that Weak Crossover violations yield relatively mild cases of ungrammaticality.
(xxv) a. His mother respects every man (is interpretable on a bound reading if her is treated as
if it were a trace with index -2)
a'. [[every man][ [the [t-2 mother]] [respect t-1]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff for some x in X satisfying [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=1, [[[ [the [t-2 mother]]
[respect t-1]]  ]] w jAˆmH, x=#,
iff for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[[ [respect t-1]  ]] w jAˆmHˆt, x=#, with
t=[[ [the [t-2 mother]] ]] w jAˆmH, x,
iff for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[respect]] w jAˆmHˆtˆ1, x=#
Side computation
[[ [the [t-2 mother]] ]] w jAˆmH, x=# iff there is 0 or more than 1 x' in X satisfying [[  [t-2
mother]]] w jAˆmH, xˆx'=1, iff there is 0 or more than 1 x' in X satisfying x'ˆxŒIw(mother).
Otherwise, [[ [the [t-2 mother]] ]] w jAˆmH, x=x', where x' satisfies x'ˆxŒIw(mother).
Thus [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[respect]] w jAˆmHˆtˆ1, x=#,
iff (i) for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), there is 0 or more than 1 x' in X satisfying
x'ˆxŒIw(mother), or
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(ii) for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), there is exactly one x' in X satisfying
x'ˆxŒIw(mother), and that x' is j or m [for in this case Non-Redundancy is violated; see the
Note following (xxiii) above].
Otherwise, [[ a']] w jAˆmH=1 iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), [[respect]] w jAˆmHˆx'ˆ1,
x=1, where x' satisfies x'ˆxŒIw(mother),
iff for each x in X satisfying xŒIw(man), x'ˆxŒIw(respect), where x' satisfies
x'ˆxŒIw(mother)
(xxvi) a. He respects every man (yields a Strong Crossover violation if he is bound by every man,
i.e. if the intended reading is Every man respects himself)  
a'. [[every man][he-1 [respect t-1]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff for some x in X satisfying [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=1, [[ [he-1 [respect t-1]] ]] w
jAˆmH, x=#. This condition is always met because (jAˆmH)-1= mH is not adequate for the
pronoun he.
Note: Contrary to what was the case for the Weak Crossover violation in (xxiv), it won't help to
interpret the pronoun as if it were a trace, for this will immediately give rise to a violation of Non-
Redundancy, as is illustrated in the following derivation (to be compared with (xxv)).
(xxvii) a. He respects every man (yields a violation of Non-Redundancy if he is reanalyzed as a
trace bound by every man)  
a'. [[every man][t-1 [respect t-1]]]
b. [[ a']] w jAˆmH=# iff for some x in X satisfying [[man]] w jAˆmH, x=1, [[ [t-1 [respect t-1]] ]] w
jAˆmH, x=#,
iff for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(student), x=1, [[ [respect t-1] ]] w jAˆmHˆ1, x=#,
iff for some x in X satisfying xŒIw(student), x=1, [[ respect ]] w jAˆmHˆ1ˆ1, x=#.
This condition is always met because jAˆmHˆ1ˆ1 violates Non-Redundancy.
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1This is by no means an unexceptionable generalization. There are at least two kinds of problems with it:
(i) It appears that a pronoun can be bound from a non-argument position, as long as the binder is non-quantificational, for
instance in John, his mother likes. This refinement is predicted by our final account.
(ii) There are cases in which a pronoun is bound by a quantifier which is in a non-argument position, as in Every boy's
mother likes him, whose Logical Form must be something like [Every boy]i [[ti's mother] likes himi]. For these cases
Büring (2003) has proposed an E-type analysis in which him goes proxy for a definite description such as the boy in s,
where s is a situation variable bound by a quantifier introduced by every boy. If such an analysis is feasible, it can be
adapted to the present framework.
2 In the following I call 'referring expressions' those expressions whose value in an individual. The R-expressions are a
proper subset of these (since anaphoric pronouns are referring expressions, but are not R-expressions). This follows
standard syntactic terminology (except for the classification of demonstrative pronouns as R-expressions).
3 Heim (1993) identifies guises with semantic values of descriptions, i.e. individual concepts; on the other hand the
metaphor of the 'memory register' would require that we use descriptions rather than their values, since what is contained
in a memory register is a symbol rather than its denotation; we will largely disregard this distinction in what follows.
4 A more sophisticated version of the theory can dispense with empty cells, as is discussed in Section 4.
5 We will relativize truth and denotation to a sequence of evaluation and to a world parameter  because we need some
account of attitude reports, which provide one of the simplest examples of syntactic recursion.
6 This definition will be modified when we analyze quantificational expressions. On a correct analysis the determiner the
must manipulate a sequence, which for theory-internal reasons cannot be the sequence of evaluation but what we will call
the 'quantificational sequence'. The rule in (14)c is provided only to give a preliminary idea of the semantics we will
posit. The 'official' system is found in Appendix III.
7 It should be noted that the rules in (14) and (15) taken together force the syntax of 3-place predicates to be somewhat
abstract. This is because a predicate can be interpreted only after all its arguments have been entered in the sequence of
evaluation, in an order that mirrors c-command. Thus Bill introduced Ann to Sam must be given a syntax in which the
verb is interpreted in a position c-commanded by each of its arguments. While I will not discuss the syntax of ditransitive
verbs in greater detail, I should point out that the required structures are essentially Larsonian 'shells' (Larson 1988), as in
the following simplified representation:
(i) a. Bill introduced Ann to Sam
b. [Bill [Ann [introduced to Sam]]
In this structure the verb originates in a position which is a sister to the Prepositional Phrase, and moves to its surface
position by head-movement, an operation that does not affect interpretation (so that despite the movement the verb is
interpreted in its base position). With this structure the interpretation of (ia) is unproblematic: the arguments are entered
in the sequence before the verb is evaluated, as is desired and as is illustrated below (I assume, as is common, that to is
semantically vacuous).
(ii) [[ [Bill [Sam [introduced (to) Ann]]]]] w  jAˆmH
=[[ [Sam [introduced (to) Ann]]]] w jAˆmHˆb
=[[ introduced (to) Ann]] w jAˆmHˆbˆs
=[[ introduced (to) Ann]] w jAˆmHˆbˆsˆa
=1 iff bˆsˆaŒIw(introduce)
As suggested by B. Spector (p.c.), we could also dispense with this abstract syntax if we were willing to posit a special
rule of interpretation for ditransitive verbs - we could then stipulate that, say, Sam to Ann is interpreted in one fell swoop,
whereby s and a are introduced 'at the same time'  in the sequence of evaluation.
8 This part of our analysis is closest to the theory of first person pronouns sketched in Heim (1991). Heim observed that
first person pronouns are sometimes bound variables, for instance in (ia), under the reading represented in (ib):
(i)  a. Only I did my homework (therefore John didn't do this)
b. [only I]x x did myx homework
Heim suggests that first person can always be represented as bound variables if indexical uses of I are reanalyzed as
instances of binding by a l-operator, as shown below:
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(ii) a. I smoke.
b. lx Ix smoke
According to the Logical Form in (iib), the sentence denotes a property rather than a proposition - a result that Heim
welcomes, following in particular the De Se analysis offered in Lewis (1979).
With respect to indexical pronouns the present proposal can be seen as a purely semantic reinterpretation of Heim's
proposal. Instead of positing that first person pronouns are literally bound by a l-operator, we simply include their
denotation in the initial sequence of evaluation. We then treat first person pronouns in the same way as anaphoric
pronouns, so that they too recover their denotation from some position of the sequence of evaluation (in order to obtain a
Lewisian property one would have to abstract over the coordinate that bears the role 'author').  Although to my
knowledge Heim did not discuss restrictions on expressions denoting the speaker and the hearer, her analysis combined
with Reinhart's version of Condition C would could yield the same predictions as the present theory. The analysis would
go like this:
Consider a Common Ground CG in which it is presupposed that the speaker is John. To make things concrete, consider
CG as a set of centered worlds, i.e. as a set of pairs of the form <individual, world> (where intuitively the first coordinate
represents the speaker). Since it is presupposed that John is the speaker, in each of these pairs the first coordinate must be
John. With respect to CG, the assertion of lx John smokes  has exactly the same effect as the assertion of  lx x smokes,
i.e. it removes from CG those pairs <John, w> for which John does not smoke in w. Reinhart's pragmatic rule requires
that the Logical Form that involves binding be preferred over that which involves coreference. This explains why I smoke
is preferred to John smokes when uttered by John in that Common Ground.
9 The descriptions must be rigidified so as to denote the same individual in every possible world. If we used non-
rigidified descriptions we would predict that, say, a demonstrative pronoun embedded under a modal operator could
denote non-rigidly (i.e. that it could denote different individuals in different possible worlds), which does not appear to
be the case.
10 Thanks to Laurence Danlos for pointing out the relevance of Corblin's work for this discussion.
11 Corblin's constraint is stated as follows:
(i) If a and b belong to ECNP, NP is the only designator authorized for its denotation.
ECNP is the 'epistemic community' of people who know that NP denotes what it in fact denotes. Thus Corblin's constraint
(which might well be too strong as it stands) is relativized to a speaker and addressee that share assumptions about the
denotation of referential terms.
12 Aloni's definition is as follows ( Aloni 1999). If  D is a domain of individuals and W is a domain of possible worlds,
and M=<D, W>:
A Conceptual Cover CC over M is a set of individual concepts such that:
"wŒW "dŒD $!cŒCC c(w)=d
13 For simplicity I only discuss that-clauses. As far as I can tell standard approaches to if- and when-clauses (e.g. in terms
of general quantification over worlds and times) could be translated into the present framework.
14 I note in passing that this analysis predicts that propositions could be the object of anaphora, and that in such cases
they should be subject to Condition C. The first prediction is clearly correct, as shown by sentences such as Bush claims
that the war is imminent, but I don't believe it. The second prediction is harder to test because it is not entirely easy to
make a that-clause appear in the scope of a coreferring pronoun. French clitics make things a bit easier, because they
appear in a position that c-commands the entire IP they are adjoined to. The following paradigm, modeled after examples
in Wasow (1972), suggests that the prediction might  indeed be correct:
(i) a. Parce que Marie l'a écrit, je crois moi aussi que la guerre est imminente.
  Because that Marie it has written, I believe me too that war is imminent
b. ?Parce que Marie a écrit que la guerre est imminente, je le crois moi aussi
Because that Marie has written that the war is imminent, I it believe me too
c. Je crois que la guerre est imminente parce que Marie l'a écrit.
I believe that war is imminent because that Marie it has written
d. *?Je le crois parce que Marie a écrit que la guerre est imminente
I it believe because that Marie has written that the war is imminent.
15 These speculations could be extended to the case (which will be relevant later in the paper) in which both singular and
plural individuals are admitted in the ontology. Cognitive economy would then presumably dictate that one should not
create a new file for an individual that has some part P in common with another individual for which a file already exists
(because this would scatter information about P among two different files).  This case is relevant when disjoint reference
effects are analyzed in greater detail. See the discussion in Section 6.
16 Note that under this analysis Condition B effects are correctly predicted for 3-place predicates. Consider what happens
in the evaluation of Bill introduced Peter to him-i under an initial sequence s. As above I posit a Larsonian-like structure
at Logical Form, as in (i)a', which gives rise to the truth-conditions in (i)b.
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(i) a. Bill introduced Peter to him-i
a'. [Bill [Peter [introduced (to) him-i]]]
b. [[ a']] ws=[[ [Peter [introduced (to) him-i]]]] w sˆb
=[[ introduced (to) him-i]] w sˆbˆp
If i=1, the final sequence is sˆbˆ#ˆp, which yields a failure when the 3-place predicate introduce is evaluated with respect
to it; and similarly if i=2, since in that case the final sequence is sˆ#ˆpˆb, which also contains a '#' in one of its last three
positions. Coreference between him and Peter or Bill is thus correctly blocked.
17 Kehler (1993) gives the following principle (his (26):
A referential element is linked to the most immediate coreferential element that c-commands it in the syntax.
18 How can we extend this analysis of the strict/sloppy distinction to other constructions that display a similar ambiguity?
Consider for instance Only John likes his mother, which may mean that only John is an individual x such that x likes x's
mother, or that  only John is an individual x such that x likes John's mother. The simplest solution would be to reduce
this case to ellipsis, by analyzing this sentence as: John likes his mother. Nobody else does like his mother, where the VP
of the second sentence has been elided. This could be implemented within a focus-based semantics for only, along the
following lines: only DPF VP is felicitous iff DP VP is true. If so, only DPF VP is true iff no salient alternative d to DP is
such that d does too VP is true. It is as yet unclear whether there is independent evidence for such an analysis.
19 This is particularly surprising because in ellipsis the reflexive clitic 'se' only allows for sloppy readings:
(i) Jean s'aime. Pierre aussi.
 Jean SE likes. Peter too
 Ok Meaning 1: Pierre likes Pierre.
*Meaning 2: Pierre likes Jean
20It should be explained why focus-sensitive constructions (e.g. constructions with only or even) facilitate the introduction
of different guises to refer to the same individual. This is left for future research.
21 There might be an additional problem with a truth-conditional version of the Locality of Variable Binding. Consider
the following configuration, in which Bill c-commands John and Bill and John c-command he:
(i) Billi ... Johnk  ... [everyone bought the same book as him]
Now observe that if the domain of quantification includes both John and Bill, Everyone bought the same book as John is
true if and only if Everyone bought the same book as Bill is true. Thus the truth conditions of the embedded clause should
be the same whether he is coindexed with John or with Bill. As a result, truth-conditional economy should prevent he
from denoting John. This is a very dubious result, though a longer discussion would be needed to establish this (in
particular we would also have investigate what happens when meanings-as-truth-conditions are replaced with structured
meanings). I leave this question for future research.
22 As a finale note to this section, it should be observed that the predictions made by the present system for the analysis
of ellipsis have not yet been seriously investigated, and could turn out to be deeply flawed. In particular, we predict that
an elided anaphoric pronoun could be bound by an element which is not in the elided part of the sentence - a prediction
which does not hold in simple accounts based on l-abstraction. An example is given below (the indexing for his is the
one required by the 'official' version of the system, given in Appendix III):
(i) Bush decided that the White house would announce that Laura had invited his-3 brother.
Clinton decided that his office would announce that Hillary had too invited his-3 brother.
In standard accounts it is predicted that a sloppy reading can be obtained for his brother only if his is bound within the
elided site. This is not the case in the present theory. On the other hand we predict that a failure should result if his office
is replaced with he-1, as this would have the effect of forcing the pronoun his-3 to access an empty cell. I doubt that this
prediction is borne out:
(ii) Bush decided that the White house would announce that Laura had invited his-3 brother.
Clinton decided that he-1 would announce that Hillary had too invited his-3 brother.
23 See Butler (2003) for another account of Crossover effects that relies on a distinction between two sequences of
evaluation. See Barker & Shan (2003) for a very detailed semantic account of Weak Crossover, based on entirely
different principles.
24 Thanks to G. Chierchia and B. Spector for suggesting that this point be clarified.
25 An alternative would be to claim that the trace and its antecedent simply carry the same index, as on standard accounts.
The role of the trace would then be to introduce in the quantificational sequence that very same index. This mechanism is
simpler than the one we adopt in two respects:
(i) it obviates the need for a syntactic mechanism that ensures that the trace gets the 'right' negative index (the difficulty
is that the value of the index depends on how many quantifiers intervene between the trace and its antecedent; it is
unclear how the syntactic rule should best be stated);
(ii) it allows for a simpler semantics for traces, since we may simply decide that a trace ti has the effect of introducing the
index i in the quantificational sequence.
On the other hand, the system we decided upon allows for a slightly more elegant semantics for determiners and nouns.
The choice between these two systems is left for future research.
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26 The reasons is this. Consider a configuration such as Q ... t -1 Q'... pro -1, where pro-1 is to retrieve the index introduced
by t-1 (which is itself bound by Q). If t-1 were, say,  to introduce in the sequence of evaluation an index -1 to indicate that
the last element of the quantificational sequence is to be retrieved, we would obtain the wrong result when pro-1 is
processed. For pro-1 would have the effect of turning the sequence sˆ-1 into the sequence sˆ#ˆ-1. On the other hand
because Q' was processed between the moment t-1 was interpreted and that at which pro-1 was interpreted, the relevant
quantificational sequence will be of the form dˆd' rather than simply d, as was the case before Q' was processed; this has
the undesirable result that pro-1 will in the end cross-reference d' rather than d. To avoid this problem we count elements
of the quantificational sequence 'from the beginning', in such a way that the same element is cross-referenced by any
pronoun anaphoric on a trace, no matter how many quantifiers have been processed between the trace and the pronoun.
This is the motivation for the somewhat complicated definition in (68). This difficulty would be circumvented if we
adopted the alternative treatment of traces and quantifiers sketched in the preceding footnote.
27 More technically: every element that satisfies the restrictor of [each of you] i is an addressee, and thus should satisfy the
presupposition of the nuclear scope ti is so depressed that youi can't sleep  - contrary to fact.
28 Roumi Pancheva observes further complexities, which I give in their French version (her original data are from
Bulgarian). In 'La plupart d'entre vous êtes si fatigués que vous devriez vous reposer' (Most of you-pl are-2nd pl. so tired
that you-pl should have some rest), the bound pronoun can apparently appear in the second person plural, although the
present theory predicts that only a third person plural pronoun should be possible. Note that the third person option is
also grammatical: 'La plupart d'entre vous sont si inquiets qu'ils devraient se reposer' (Most of you-pl are-3rd pl. so tired
that they-pl should have some rest). I leave this point for future research.
29 It will not have escaped the reader's attention that Fox's account of reconstruction is based on a truth-conditional notion
of economy. Although we claimed earlier that with respect to the analysis of binding Denotational Economy is superior
to Truth-conditional economy, we had not quarrel with Fox's analysis of quantifier movement.
